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SUMMARY
This thesis investigates the impact of finance on technological innovation. In
the first essay we study the causal relation between informativeness of stock prices
and innovative efficiency. Using mutual fund flow-driven price pressure as an exoge-
nous shock, we show that impairment of stock price efficiency diminishes innovative
efficiency. In the year following the price-pressure shock, patents per R&D dollar
drop by 4.7%, while citations are 26.2% lower. Consistent with market feedback,
stock mispricing has a greater effect on innovative efficiency when there is less infor-
mation available from other sources, such as insider information or peers’ stock prices.
We do not find evidence supporting alternative explanations such as the endogeneity
of mutual fund trading, financing effect, managerial incentive, or shareholder short-
termism. Overall, our findings show that stock markets improve real efficiency by
providing useful market feedback.
The second essay examines the implication of intellectual property protection (IP)
to equity financing. Firms can protect IP by either keeping their inventions secret or
seeking patent protection and disclosing the inventions. We expect the relative pro-
tection conferred by the methods to affect the choice between secrecy and patenting.
Further, we expect the manner of IP protection to affect the information released by
firms and, hence, their stock liquidity and cost of equity capital. For our empirical
analysis, we rely on the exogenous passage of state-level statutes that strengthened
trade secret protection. We show that stronger trade-secret protection increased
opaqueness and reduced stock liquidity. Firms that raised equity capital after the
enactment of trade secret statutes experienced more negative stock market reactions.
x
By contrast, the implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS), that strengthened patent protection, improved the
transparency and stock liquidity of patenting firms. After TRIPS the stock market
reaction to equity offering by these firms was also less negative. Our findings suggest
that stronger patent protection encourages more information disclosure and reduces
financing frictions, while stronger secrecy protection induces opaqueness and makes
equity financing more difficult.
In the third essay, we show that corporate investment in R&D declines sharply
following a financial-covenant violation, wherein creditors can use the threat of ac-
celerating the loan to press for changes in firm policies. The reduction in R&D is
more severe in firms with low R&D efficiency i.e., when firm R&D is less produc-
tive in terms of ROA and delivers fewer patents and citations. It is striking that,
despite decrease in R&D, covenant-violating firms do not suffer a drop in innovative
output (patents and citations-to-patents). These results highlight that lenders are
judicious in exercising their control rights after covenant violations and suggest that
bank financing can be a viable source of financing for innovative firms.
xi
CHAPTER I
DOES PRICE EFFICIENCY AFFECT REAL
EFFICIENCY? EVIDENCE FROM INNOVATIVE
ACTIVITIES
1.1 Introduction
It is generally believed that efficient financial market promotes real efficiency. Primar-
ily, stock prices facilitate resource allocation by affecting firms’ financing. Efficient
markets, by accurately reflecting the value of firms’ investment opportunity, ensure
firms that have profitable investment projects have access to the needed capital. More-
over, stock markets may serve as a means of aggregating investors’ information and
providing managers with feedback that guides their investment decisions (Dow and
Gorton, 1997). An efficient secondary stock markets can also help mitigate agency
problems by rendering stock-based incentive contracts more effective (Holmström and
Tirole, 1993).
In the empirical literature, a number of studies examine how the secondary stock
markets affect real decision making and, hence, real efficiency. These studies typically
focus on the impact of secondary stock market on firms’ actions, such as financing and
investment decisions.1 However, direct empirical evidence linking financial market
efficiency to real efficiency is still lacking. In this paper, we aim to address this issue
and examine the empirical relation between price efficiency and real efficiency.
To study the long term impact of price efficiency, we focus on firms’ R&D invest-
ment. Technological innovations have been recognized as a critical driver of economic
1e.g., See Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2006; Hau and Lai, 2013,
Gao and Lou, 2013; Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston, 2014; etc.;
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growth (Solow, 1957). As Baumol (2001) has pointed out, much of the technological
innovation is contributed by established, public corporations. Meanwhile, there has
been a debate as to whether stock market facilitate or hinder innovative activities.
On the negative side, stock markets are sometimes blamed for inducing myopic be-
havior on the part of managers, discouraging longer-term investment, such as in R&D
(Stein, 1988). A more positive view, however, is that the stock market can recognize
the value of R&D investment by aggregating the information from a large number
of investors (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Therefore, it is not as yet fully understood
whether stock market efficiency contributes to the efficiency of innovative activities.
We measure innovative efficiency by estimating the empirical relation between
R&D investment and subsequent innovation output proxied by the number of patent
applications and the future citations (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2012). As R&D and
patents reflect innovation input and output, their relation provides a direct measure
of the efficiency of innovative activities compared with other more general measures
of performance such as ROA, which may be influenced by many factors. Our identifi-
cation strategy is to exploit an exogenous shock that induces stock price inefficiency.
Specifically, we examine the impact of exogenous stock mispricing caused by mu-
tual fund flow-driven price pressure (Coval and Stafford, 2007). Coval and Stafford
(2007) find that mutual funds that increase (decrease) existing positions because of
a large inflow (outflow) create price pressure in their overlapping holdings. Stocks
under such pressure experience a temporary change in price that is reversed over time,
which is an indication of mispricing. The exogeneity assumption can be justified on
the grounds that such price pressure is driven by funding liquidity and is not related
to the fundamentals of the firm.
We find that stock mispricing caused by mutual fund pressure adversely impacts
future innovative efficiency. Based on our estimation, the same amount of R&D leads
to 4.7% lower number of patent applications and 26.2% lower number of citations for
2
these patents in the year after stock mispricing caused by mutual fund fire sales or
purchases in a quarter. Moreover, our findings cannot be explained by the endogeneity
of mutual fund pressure since both stock over-pricing and under-pricing lead to lower
innovative efficiency.
We explore several potential mechanisms that may explain the link between price
efficiency and innovative efficiency. Our first hypothesis is the market feedback hy-
pothesis. That is, first, stock prices communicate information that leads to more
efficient investment in innovative projects. Second, this effect comes from stock mar-
ket learning, where managers glean information from the stock price and take it into
account while making R&D investment decisions. The economic rationale is that
stock markets aggregate information from a large number of participants who have
information from various sources other than from inside firms (Grossman, 1976; Hell-
wig, 1980; Allen, 1995). There is evidence that managers adjust firm investment
policy in response to stock market feedback (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007).
Moreover, empirical proxies for stock price informativeness, such as firm-specific re-
turn variation, is shown to be positively related to capital budgeting quality and firm
performance in terms of ROA and sales growth (Durnev, Morck and Yeung, 2004).
Information may come from various sources. For example, other than market
feedback from the firm’s stock, managers can also obtain information from internal
sources or their competitors (Foucault and Fresard, 2013). Therefore, stock market
feedback may play a less important role when managers receive more information from
alternative sources. Under this hypothesis, we expect exogenous price inefficiency to
have a weaker effect on innovative efficiency when managers have more insider infor-
mation or more information from the stock prices of their competitors. Consistent
with this hypothesis, we find that mispricing induced by mutual fund flow-driven
pressure has a stronger effect on innovative efficiency when there is less insider infor-
mation proxied by earnings announcement surprise to the market, as well as lower
3
stock price informativeness proxied by the probability of informed trading (PIN ) of
peer firms (Duart and Young, 2009).
A likely alternative explanation, however, is that stock mispricing affect real effi-
ciency by constraining firms from raising capital (Baker, Stein, Wurgler, 2003; Gao
and Lou, 2013; Hau and Lai, 2013). Under this hypothesis, stock mispricing would
have a stronger impact on R&D efficiency when firms are financially constrained.
However, we find that the relation between stock mispricing and innovative efficiency
is concentrated among financially unconstrained firms. This result rules out financ-
ing as a potential mechanism that explains the effect of price efficiency on innovative
efficiency.
Stock price may also enhance real efficiency by aligning managers’ interest with
shareholders’ interest through incentive contracts (Holmström and Tirole, 1993). As
incentive contracts tie managers’ compensation to the stock prices, stock prices play
an monitoring role by reflecting managers’ performance. As a result, a more effi-
cient stock price enhance the effectiveness of incentive contract and thus improve real
performance. Using CEO’s wealth-performance sensitivity developed by Edmans,
Gabaix and Landier (2009) as the measure of managerial incentive, we show that
mispricing has a similar effect on innovative efficiency across firms with different level
of managerial incentive, suggesting that managerial incentive cannot fully explain the
real effect of price efficiency.
The last possible explanation, raised in the behavioral finance literature, is that
managers irrationally follow the stock price. One type of the irrational behavior is
market timing, that firms seek to raise capital when stock is overvalued (Baker, Stein,
Wurgler, 2003). This explanation, however, is unlikely to stand since we find that
only firms with deep pocket are affected by stock mispricing. Another type of behav-
ioral bias is that managers follow the stock price to cater to current market sentiment
(Polk and Sapienza, 2009). When the stock price is driven by short term investors,
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stock price may cause managerial myopia as manager forgos long term investment
opportunities to boost short term performance (Stein, 1988). Under this hypothesis,
stock price should have a stronger effect on innovative efficiency with more holding by
short term investors and less holding by long term investors. However, our findings
are inconsistent with this hypothesis: First, we find that stock mispricng significantly
affects innovative efficiency only with the presence of blockholders (Edmans, 2009),
who are the type of investors that are more focused on the long term; Second, the
relation between stock mispricng and innovative efficiency increases with the owner-
ship of long term investors but not short term investors based on the classification
by Bushee (1998). Overall, our empirical evidences support the market feedback
hypothesis over other possible explanations.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it adds to the lit-
erature on the real effects of financial markets.2 Several previous studies discuss
the link between price efficiency and real efficiency. For example, Dow and Gorton
(1997) provide a theoretical framework for this relation when managers learn from
stock prices. Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) examine the relation between price
efficiency and capital budgeting efficiency by using firm specific return variation as
a measure of price informativeness. There are also studies that document evidence
for market feedback mechanism in investment decisions (e.g., Chen, Goldstein, and
Jiang, 2007; Foucault and Gehrig, 2008; Bakke and Whited, 2010). These papers ad-
dress the endogeneity of stock prices either by structural estimation or cross-sectional
variation that is consistent with theoretical predictions. Our paper, however, provides
evidence on the causal relation between price efficiency and real efficiency with an
exogenous shock to stock prices.
2For example, see Luo, 2005; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; Foucault and Gehrig, 2008; Kau,
Linck, and Rubin, 2008; Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009; Bakke and Whited, 2010; Edmans, Goldstein,
and Jiang, 2012; Foucault and Fresard, 2012; Foucault and Fresard, 2013; and Ozoguz and Rebello,
2013. See Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) for a survey.
5
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on the financing of innovations.3 In
particular, we contribute to the debate as to whether the equity market encourages
or impedes longer-term investment. On one hand, the stock market may induce
managerial myopia due to takeover threats (Stein, 1988; Shleifer and Summers, 1988)
or frequent trading by investors (Bushee, 1998). On the other hand, the equity
market involves a large number of investors and sources of information, increasing
the chance of recognizing the value of R&D investments compared with relationship-
based financing (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Atanassov, Nanda, and Seru, 2007). Our
finding that informative stock prices improve R&D efficiency suggests that given a
certain level of efficiency, the stock market is able to recognize the value of R&D
investments. This differs from recent studies that show that the stock market fails to
value achieved innovations (Cohen, Deither, and Malloy, 2012; Hirshleifer, Hsu, and
Li, 2012), as our study shows that the stock market conveys information about the
value of future R&D opportunities.
Finally, our study sheds more light on the consequences of stock mispricing. We
show that stock mispricing due to mutual fund fire-sales/purchases adversely affects
firms’ future innovative efficiency by hindering stock market learning by managers.
Hence, liquidity shocks can undermine the informational role of the stock market.
Our findings imply that stock market frictions can affect the real economy and they
add to the literature on the causes and consequences of stock mispricing.4
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes our data and the
construction of variables in the empirical analysis. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 discuss the
main empirical results and the potential mechanisms. Finally, we provide concluding
3For example, see Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Atanassov, Nanda, and Seru, 2007; Brown, Fazzari,
and Petersen, 2009; Chava, Oettl, Subramanian, and Subramanian, 2012; Chava, Nanda, and Xiao,
2013.
4For example, Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), Coval and Stafford (2007), Polk
and Sapienza (2009), Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012), Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), Hau
and Lai, (2013), etc.
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remarks in Section 1.5.
1.2 Data
We draw our data from five main sources. We obtain stock price information from
CRSP, accounting information from Compustat, institutional ownership data from
Thompson Reuters 13F data, earnings announcement dates from I/B/E/S, and patent
and citation data from the Harvard patent database.5 The Harvard patent database
provides information on patents granted from 1975 to 2010, along with all citations
these patents receive over the same period.6 Using the assignee-PERMNO link pro-
vided by the Noah Stoffman, we match the patent applications to public firms in
Compustat and CRSP.7 This allows us to match firms’ patenting activities to their
financial information. We only include patent data up to 2007 to avoid the estimates
from being driven truncation bias in patent applications (Dass, Nanda, and Xiao,
2014) and financial crisis. We include publicly traded firms listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ, and exclude firms in the
financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (4900-4999) industries. We also require that
firms have at least one non-zero value of R&D investment over the sample period.
After merging data from various sources, we have an unbalanced panel with 11,381
firms and 86,180 firm-year observations from 1987 to 2007.
1.2.1 Innovation and Innovative Efficiency
We measure innovation output of innovative activities using the number of patent
applications in year t + n. Similarly, we measure innovation quality as the number
of citations for the patents applied for in year t + n. In the empirical analysis we
5https://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/patent
6A detailed description of patent data can be found in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and
Lai et al. (2013).
7We thank Noah Stoffman for making the assignee-PERMNO link available. It can be downloaded
from https://iu.app.box.com/patents
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use innovation output (or citations) in same year, one year after, or two years after
R&D investment because of an expected lag between R&D investment and innovative
output. The number of patent applications is subject to truncation bias towards the
end of the sample period because many patents applied near the end of the sample are
not yet granted. So is the number of citations as newer patents tend to accumulate
few citations than older patents. Hall et al. (2001) provide a detail discussion on the
truncation bias of patent data and propose methods to adjust for this bias. However,
Dass, Nanda, and Xiao (2014) find that these adjustment methods are insufficient
to correct the truncation bias toward the end of the sample and may generate bias
in the estimation. We use two approaches to avoid the empirical results from being
driven by the truncation bias. First, we drop the observations in the last three years
of the Harvard patent data sample (2008-2010) since Dass et al. (2014) find that the
truncation problem is the most severe in the last several years. Second, we follow
Hall et al. (2001) and adjust the number of patent applications and citations. For
the number of patents, we back out the missing portion of patent applications based





where y is the application year, fraci is the fraction of patents that takes i years to
process the application. We estimate fraci from the sample pf patent applications
from 1998 to 2003 and use it to adjust the number of patent applications from 2004
onwards since majority of patents are granted within seven years. For the number of
citations, we use the adjustment factor provided by Hall et al. (2001) the adjust the
number upward for the new patents.
Recent studies show that innovative efficiency is an important factor of the firm
value. Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2012) document that firms that have greater innova-
tive efficiency have higher future operating performance and higher stock returns that
cannot be explained by well-known risk factors. In addition, they find that proxies
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for investor inattention and valuation uncertainty can explain the predictability of
innovative efficiency to future stock returns. This finding suggests that innovative
efficiency is a factor of the future firm value that has not been fully considered by
investors.
1.2.2 Mutual Fund Flow-driven Price Pressure
We use mutual fund flow-driven price pressure as an exogenous shock that causes stock
mispricing. Coval and Stafford (2007) find that mutual funds that increase (decrease)
existing positions because of a large inflow (outflow) create price pressure in their
overlapping holdings. Stocks under such pressure seem to experience a temporary
change in price that is reversed over time.8 Our contention is that such price pressure,
unrelated to stock’s fundamentals, will cause stock mispricing and therefore reduces
price efficiency.
We extract the data on domestic equity fund size and return from the CRSP
Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund Database, and mutual fund stock holding data
from Thompson Reuters, and merge the two datasets using MFLINKS. With mutual
fund size and return, we calculate fund flow following the mutual fund literature:
Flowk,t =
TNAkt − TNAkt−1(1 +Rkt)
TNAkt−1
, (2)
where TNAkt is total net assets of fund k at the end of quarter t and Rkt is the
reported return of fund k over the quarter. We follow Coval and Stafford (2007) and
focus on funds that are experiencing extreme inflow or outflow. Funds are regarded
as experiencing extreme inflow (outflow) if Flowk,t is above the 90
th percentile (below
the 10th percentile) of the sample during the quarter. As in Coval et al. (2007) and
Cai et al. (2013), flow-driven trading is defined as the aggregate trading by mutual
8Such price pressure is used in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) to identify the trigger effect
of stock prices on takeover activities. Cai, Cremers, and Wei (2013) show that when the stock price
is under such price pressure, the board will rely more on accounting-based performance rather than
the stock price in setting CEO compensation. Both papers support the notion that mispricing due
to mutual fund fire sales/purchases have real effects on firm decisions and values.
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funds experiencing extreme fund flow, scaled by the number of shares outstanding at






where ∆Holdingsi,k,t is change in the number of shares held by mutual funds. We
consider only the increase (decrease) in holdings by funds experiencing inflow (out-
flow), as those trades are more likely to be flow-driven. We then subtract the sells by
funds with outflow from the purchases by funds with inflow to get the net flow-driven
trades for a stock. We require a stock to be owned by at least 5 funds in calculating
net fund flow-driven trades.
We follow Cai et al. (2013) and assign a variable to each firm-quarter that equals
to 1 if the net fund flow-driven trade in Equation (3) is positive, -1 if the net fund flow-
driven trade is negative, and 0 otherwise. We then take an average of this variable
for all four quarters of a fiscal year and use the absolute value of this average as the
instrumental variable. We also conduct our analysis using positive and negative stock
price pressure as separate instrumental variables.
Both Coval et al. (2007) and Cai et al. (2013) show that there is a positive (neg-
ative) abnormal return for stocks under positive (negative) fund flow-driven price
pressure, with the stock price reversing eventually in both cases. We find a similar
pattern of stock returns after price pressure in our data. Figure 1 and 2 show the
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over equal-weight market return around the mu-
tual fund fire sales and purchases identified each quarter.9 Figure 1 shows that stock
price goes as far as 3% below market after mutual fund negative pressure and reverse
to close to zero in two years. Similar but opposition observation is found for mutual
fund’s positive pressure as shown in Figure 2, though it takes shorter time to reverse.
9The curve is smoothen by taking a three-month moving average.
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Both of these figures shows that stock price movement after mutual fund flow-driven
pressure are reversed over time, consistent with previous studies on mutual fund fire
sales (Coval et al., 2007; and Cai et al., 2013) and reflect stock mispricing under such
pressure.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analyses.
The mean value of innovation output measured by Ln(Patent) is 0.511 with standard
deviation of 1.052. The mean value of Ln(R&D) is 1.014 and standard deviation is
1.524. As previously mentioned, Pressure is a variable ranging from 0 to +1, with
an increment of 0.25 indicating a significant mutual fund pressure in one out of four
quarters. This variable has mean value of 0.035 and standard deviation of 0.103.
Other firm and industry variables indicated in the table serve primarily as controls
in our regression analysis.
1.3 Empirical Design and Results
1.3.1 Price Inefficiency and Innovative Efficiency
We test the effect of stock inefficiency on innovative efficiency using the following
model:
Ln(Innovation)t+n = α1 + β1Ln(R&D)t+1 + β2Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressuret
+ β3Pressuret + γ
′
1CONTROL+ φi + ψt + εi,t. (4)
Here φi and ψt+1 stand for fixed effects for firm i and year t + 1, respectively.
Ln(Innovation) is either measured by the adjusted number of patent applications
or the adjusted number of total citations on the patents. Ln(R&D) measures the
natural logarithm of R&D expenditure in million dollars. We do not scale R&D by
sales or assets because the dependent variable is also unscaled and correlated with firm
size. To capture the correlation with firm size, we instead include Ln(Assets) in the
regression. CONTROL includes a number of firm and industry characteristics that
are likely to affect firms’ R&D investment and innovation. In addition to firm size,
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we include firm characteristics such as Leverage, CAPEX, Tangibility, ROA, Q, and
SA Index. In addition, we also follow Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt
(2005) and control for product market competition by including the Herfindahl Index
at 4-digit SIC industry level, along with Herfindahl2 to capture any non-linear effect
of competition on innovation.
The above model tests how stock mispricing in year t affect the efficiency of R&D
investment in year t+1. The estimate of β1 reflects the efficiency of R&D investment
when stock prices are not affected by mutual fund flow-driven pressure. β1 + β2
measures the efficiency of R&D following stock mispricing caused by mutual fund
pressure. If price efficiency has a positive causal effect on innovative efficiency but
this role is hindered by exogenous mispricing due to mutual fund pressure, then one
would expect β2 to be significantly negative while β1 is significantly positive.
10 Chen,
Goldstein, and Jiang (2006) show that firms’ investments including R&D are more
sensitive to their stock prices when the stock prices are more informative, suggesting
that managers learn from stock prices for making R&D investment decisions and
that depends on the information quality of the stock prices. Here we directly test
the implication of stock price informativeness to the efficiency of R&D investment,
as when stocks are mispriced, informativeness of stock prices clearly declines.
The results are presented in Table 2. The estimate of β1 is significant at the 1%
level across all specifications, indicating that the same amount of R&D on average
leads to more innovation output. Our variable of interest, β2, is significantly positive
at 5% for the number of patents in year t + 2 and t + 3 and is significant at 1% for
the total number of citations of patents applied in all the subsequent three years.
This result is consistent with our prediction that price inefficiency reduces innovativ
efficiency. The economic magnitude for the effect of mispricing is substantial. For
10To avoid the estimates from being driven by the multicollinearity between Ln(R&D)t+1 ×
Pressuret and Pressuret, we use the demeaned value of Ln(R&D) when computing the interaction
term.
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example, based on estimates in column (2) the estimated β1 is 0.215 while β2 is -0.04,
suggesting that the efficiency of of R&D investment in terms of generating patents
reduces by 4.7% when there is stock mispricing caused by mutual fund pressure in
one quarter. The estimated effect on the number of citations is larger in magnitude.
Based on the estimates in column (5), the efficiency of R&D in terms of generating
citations reduces by 26.2%. The larger impact on citations suggest that mispricing
not only reduces R&D efficiency in terms of quantity of innovation, but also reduces
R&D effectiveness in terms of the quality of innovation.
Another interesting observation is that the estimated coefficient for Pressure is
not significant. This estimate suggests that stock mispricing has no direct effect
on innovation output, but it affects innovation by influencing the efficiency R&D
investment. One plausible explanation is that price inefficiency leads to suboptimal
R&D decisions. More detailed discussion regarding the mechanism is in the later
session. The estimated coefficients on other control variables are mostly consistent
with the literature: the level of innovation is higher for firms with larger size, lower
leverage, higher tangibility, and higher Tobin’s Q. The estimated coefficient for the
linear term of Herfindahl is positive and that for the quadratic term is negative.
These estimates, though insignificant, also suggest an inverted U-shaped relationship
between product market competition and innovation.
One endogeneity concern with respect to this result is that mutual funds’ trading
under fund flow pressure may not be completely liquidity-driven, but still based on
information about expected firm performance. In this scenario, mutual funds trading
is endogenous and may have predictability for firms’ innovative efficiency. If this
is the case, one would expect mutual funds’ purchases to predict higher innovative
efficiency and vice versa for mutual fund sales. To test this possibility, we separate the
price pressure into two components: one caused by mutual fund purchases (Positive
Pressure) and the other caused by mutual fund sales (Negative Pressure). For each
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firm-quarter, Positive Pressure (Negative Pressure) indicator equals 1 if Flow-Driven
Trades computed in Equation (3) is positive (negative), and 0 otherwise. We then use
the average value of the indicators over the four quarters to measure the price pressure
in two directions for each firm-year. Figure 1 and 2 show the stock price movement
after mutual fund fire purchases and sales based on the above measures. The price
drift in the direction of mutual fund trades and the reversal indicate that these trades
in both direction cause mispricing in the stock. To test the differential effect of positive
pressure and negative pressure on innovative efficiency, we interact Ln(R&D) with the
two pressure variable separately in the regression similar to Equation (4). If mutual
fund pressure predicts performance, positive pressure should be related to higher
innovative efficiency. But if mutual fund pressure causes change in performance, then
mutual fund pressure in both direction causes price inefficiency and therefore should
reduce innovative efficiency.
We present the results in Table 3. In column 1 to 3, we show estimates of re-
gressions with patent as the dependent variable. The estimation shows that only
positive pressure significantly reduces the efficiency of R&D investment. In column
4 to 6, where we show the results for citations, both positive pressure and negative
pressure have significantly negative effect on the efficiency of R&D. The effect of the
two pressures are also similar in terms of magnitude. For example, based on estimates
in column 5, positive (negative) mutual fund price pressure reduces R&D efficiency
by 16.2% (20.6%). The result that mutual fund price pressure in either direction has
the same effect on R&D efficiency is an evidence against the endogeneity of mutual
fund pressure and supports our causal interpretation of the findings.
1.4 Mechanism for the Real Effect of Price Efficiency
The previous section shows that stock price informativeness has a causal effect on
innovative efficiency. In this section we study various possible mechanism that may
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explain the real effect of price efficiency.
1.4.1 Market Feedback
The first possible explaination is that managers improve R&D efficiency by glean-
ing information from the stock prices. Studies have shown that stock prices contain
valuable information that managers do not have and that these prices can potentially
guide managers in making corporate investment decisions. The economic rationale is
that stock markets aggregate information from a large number of participants who
have information from various sources other than from inside firms (Grossman, 1976;
Hellwig, 1980; Allen, 1995). There is evidence that managers adjust firm investment
policy in response to stock market feedback (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007).
Moreover, empirical proxies for stock price informativeness, such as firm-specific re-
turn variation, is shown to be positively related to capital budgeting quality and firm
performance in terms of ROA and sales growth (Durnev, Morck and Yeung, 2004).
Allen (1993) argues that the informational role of the stock market is more im-
portant when the production process is complex and there is no consensus on what
is the optimal action for the manager. In the case of innovative activities, any new
insight provided by the stock market may be particularly important if there is no
other reliable source of information for managers to learn about the prospect of the
firm’s technology. Moreover, even if the stock market is not able to provide feedback
regarding the technology of innovation, the market may still have some useful infor-
mation about the prospect of innovative projects in terms of, say, market demand
and competition. Therefore, it is plausible that the stock market can provide useful
feedback and guide managers in making R&D investment decisions. In fact, the U.S.
stock market has been attracting foreign high-technology companies to cross-list their
stocks, possibly due to its ability to value high-tech companies (Pagano, Roell, and
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Zechner, 2002). This suggests that the U.S. stock market may provide useful feed-
back about technological investment for managers. Therefore, it is possible that the
stock market aggregates and reflects private information about the prospect of inno-
vative activities and, managers are able to make use of this information and improve
innovative efficiency.
Information may come from various sources. For example, other than market
feedback from the firm’s stock, managers can also obtain information from internal
sources or their competitors (Foucault and Fresard, 2013). Therefore, stock market
feedback may play a less important role when managers receive more information from
alternative sources. Under this hypothesis, we expect exogenous price inefficiency
to have a weaker effect on innovative efficiency when managers have more insider
information or more useful information from the stock prices of their competitors.
We first test how managers’ insider information influence the relation between
price efficiency and innovative efficiency. As an empirical proxy for managers’ insider
information, we use market surprise to firms’ earnings announcement. If manager
has private information about the earnings of the firm, the information release of
firms’ earnings should generate larger stock price movement (Chen, Goldstein, and
Jiang, 2006). We measure earnings surprise by computing the absolute value of the
cumulative abnormal return over equal-weight market return from two days before
to two days after earnings announcement. And we reestimate Model (4) in three
subsamples sorted by earnings surprise. The prediction is that if managers rely less
on stock market feedback, price inefficiency should have less effect on innovative
efficiency when insider information (earnings surprise) is higher.
We present the results in Table 4. For brevity we only show results for innovation
in t+ 2 hereafter but we find consistent results with innovation in t+ 1 and t+ 3. In
column 1 to 3, the coefficient for Ln(R&D)t+1×Pressure is negative but only signifi-
cant in the middle tertile. In the regression using citations as the dependent variable,
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the estimate for the interaction term is significant at 1% in all subsamples. Moreover,
the economic magnitude is monotonically decreasing from the bottom tertile to the
top tertile. Based on the estimates in column 4 to 6, mutual fund pressure reduces
innovative efficiency by 18% in the subample with earnings surprise in the top tertile,
while the same pressure reduces innovative efficiency by 27.7% in the bottom tertile.
This result is consistent with our prediction, that stock mispricing has a greater effect
on innovative efficiency when managers have less insider information.
Another source of information is industry peers (Foucault and Fresard, 2013;
Ozoguz and Rebello, 2013). Foucault and Fresard (2013) discuss the market feedback
channel from the stock price of industry peers. Given a firm competes with industry
peers in the same product market, the stock price of the peers should also convey
information relevant to the firm. For the purpose of market learning, the firm’s own
stock price and peer’s stock price are alternative sources of information that can be
substitutable to some extent. Consistent with this prediction, they find that a firm’s
investment is more (less) sensitive to the stock price of their industry peers (their
own) when the stock prices of industry peers are more informative. If price efficiency
enhances real efficiency by providing market feedback, such effect may be weaker if
the firm receive useful information from the peers’ stock prices. We therefore test how
the effect of stock mispricing on innovative efficiency is related to the informativeness
of peer’s stock prices.
We first focus on firms that share the same three-digit SIC classification. For
proxy of price informativeness we use the probability of informed trading (PIN )
measure. This measure developed by Easley, Hvidkjær, and O’Hara (2002) captures
the amount of private information in the stock. Duarte and Young (2009) revise the
measure to further separate the information asymmetry component from the liquidity
component. We use the PIN measure constructed by Duarte and Young to measure
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the informativeness of the peers’ stock prices.11 We take the average value of PIN
for all the peers in the same three-digit SIC industry and again estimate Model (4) in
tertiles sorted by peers’ average PIN. The prediction is that the coefficient estimate
for Ln(R&D)t+1×Pressure is significantly negative and greater in magnitude in the
subsample with lower peers’ average PIN.
We show the results in Panel A of Table 5. Consistent with our prediction, we find
that the interaction term Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure for innovation is only significant
in the bottom tertile in terms of average peers’ PIN. This result suggests that stock
mispricing does not have a significant adverse effect on innovative efficiency if there
is a lot of private information in the peers’ stock prices. This is consistent with the
market feedback hypothesis since peers’ stock price can act as an substitute to the
firm’s own stock price as a source of market feedback based on the study by Foucault
and Fresard (2013).
Hoberg and Phillips (2011) develop a new industry classification called Text-based
Network Industry Classification (TNIC). They use textual analysis on the product
description in firms’ 10-K filings to identify firms with similar products. For each
firm, they find peer firms that produce similar products based on this method. The
threshold of product closeness is decided in order to match the SIC code in terms of
unconditional likelihood of two random firms being in the same industry. For exam-
ple, under the classification of TNIC3, the unconditional likelihood that two random
firms are in the same TNIC3 industry is 2.05%, which matches the unconditional
likelihood of two random firms being in the same three-digit SIC industry (Hoberg
and Phillips, 2011).12 Since learning from peers’ stock prices is more relevant among
firms producing similar products, we adopt the TNIC3 classification as an alternative
11We thank Jefferson Duarte and Lance Young for making their data available. The data can be
downloaded from http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~jd10/publications.htm
12We thank Gerard Hoberg and Gordon Phillips for making the TNIC data available. The data
can be downloaded from http://alex2.umd.edu/industrydata/industryclass.htm
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to three-digit SIC to test the market feedback hypothesis.
As previously discussed, we test the relation between the effect of stock mispricing
on innovative efficiency with average peers’ stock price informativeness. But this time
we find the peer firms based on the TNIC3 classification. We again sort the sample
to tertiles based on the average PIN of TNIC3 peers. The results are presented
in the Panel B of Table 5. For regression using citations as the innovation output
(column 4 to 6), it shows that Ln(R&D)t+1×Pressure is significantly negative only
in the middle and bottom tertiles of average peers’ PIN. This is again consistent with
our prediction as stock mispricing has no significant effect on innovative efficiency
when the amount of private information in peers’ stock price is high. For regressions
using patent as the dependent variable, we find no significant effect in any subsample,
though the coefficient magnitude is also monotonically decreasing with peers’ PIN.
The results with two different industry classifications support the argument that loss
of market feedback due to mispricing contribute to lower innovative efficiency, and
this effect is weaker when firms have more information from peers’ stock prices.
The informational role of peers’ stock prices depend not only on the amount of
information in the stock price, but also how relevant peers’ stock price is to the firm.
Presumably, information from peers’ stock price would be more useful to the firm if
firm value is more correlated with the peers. Foucault and Fresard (2013) find that
firm’s investment is more sensitive to peers’ stock prices when the firm has higher
fundamental correlation with its peers. Here we also test whether the effect of stock
mispricing on innovative efficiency is related to the fundamental correlation between
the firm and its peers. We compute the correlation of stock return betwene the firm
and its peers. To not differentiate between positive or negative correlation, we use the
absolute value of the correlation as the measure of fundamental relatedness. Similar to
previous tests, we sort the sample into tertiles based on this fundamental relatedness
measure. We again define peer firms both using three-digit SIC classification and
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TNIC3 classification.
The results are reported in Table 6. Similar to previous tests, when using patents
as the innovation measure, most of the subsamples do not have significant loading on
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure, though it is still noted that all the estimates are negative
and the magnitude is larger for the subsamples with medium or low return correlation.
For regressions using citations as the innovation measure, the coefficient estimate on
the interaction term is significant in all the subsamples. But for both results with
SIC and TNIC classification, the effect of mispricing is lower for subsample with the
highest return correlation with peers. For example, column 4 to 6 of Panel B show
that the coefficient for Ln(R&D)t+1×Pressure in the high-return-correlation sample
is -0.267, while that for the medium- and low-return-correlation sample is -0.447 and
-0.419, respectively. So the effect of stock mispricing in the higher-return-correlation
sample is about 40% smaller in magnitude than the rest of the sample. This result is
consistent with our prediction as well as Foucault and Fresard’s (2013) finding that
stock price information is less important when the firm is fundamentally more related
with its industry peers.
Overall, our empirical evidences support the market feedback hypothesis, that
price efficiency improve innovative efficiency by providing informative signals. This
informational role, however, is weaker when firms have more insider information, have
more information from peers’ stock prices, and fundamentally more correlated with
industry peers. Next we explore other alternative explanations.
1.4.2 Financing Effect
One alternative channel through which price efficiency affects innovative efficiency is
financing. When stock is mispriced, it may constraint firms’ access to equity capital
and thus reduces the efficiency of R&D investment. On the other hand, if stock
price is efficient, firms may raise equity capital more easily and be able to enhance
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innovative efficiency. In fact, a number of studies in the extant literature show that the
equity market has a supply effect firms’ investment (See Baker (2009) for a survey).
For example, Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) show that investment-Q sensitivity is
greater among equity-dependent firms. Their explanation is that stock prices can, in
themselves, influence investment by easing or worsening a firm’s financial constraints.
Hau and Lai (2009) examine mutual funds’ fire sales during the financial crisis and
show that it caused a decrease in the investment of non-financial firms. And they find
that this effect is concentrated among the financially constraint firms. Gao and Lou
(2013) also use mutual fund fire sales but look directly at firms financing activities.
They find that firms dependent on external financing issue both more equity and debt
when the stock is over-priced. All of these studies show that the equity market has a
real effect on firms’ investment by affecting financing.
If firms are not able to invest at the optimal level due to financial constraint, one
would predict financial constraint to have a negative effect on innovative efficiency.
However, as Jensen (1986) argues, agency problem can arise with free cash flow.
Financial constraint may play a disciplining role on managers by reducing free cash
flow. In fact, Almeida, Hsu, and Li (2013) find that financially constrained firms have
higher innovative efficiency. Therefore the direct relation between financial constraint
and real efficiency is yet conclusive. However, for the equity market to have a real
effect on firm’s efficiency through financing, financial constraint has to be binding.
To test this hypothesis, we follow previous approach and sort the sample into
tertiles based on proxies of financial constraint. The first proxy we use is SA Index
proposed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). It is computed as a function of firms’ size
in terms of total assets and firm age. Detailed description of the variable is available
in the Appendix. We test Model (4) in the three subsamples sorted by SA Index
and present the results in Panel A of Table 7. For regressions with patent as the
innovation measure, stock mispricing reduces the efficiency of R&D only for the firms
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in the bottom tertile of financial constraint. When testing the R&D-citation relation,
stock mispricing due to mutual fund flow-driven pressure have a significantly negative
effect on the relation only for firms with medium and low level of financial constraint.
The next empirical proxy for financial constraint is the WW Index by Whited
and Wu (2006). This index takes into account firm’s cash flow, dividend policy, long
term debt, total assets, industry growth and firm’s sales growth. We again leave
the detailed description for the variable to the Appendix. Panel B of Table 7 shows
estimates of Model (4) in subsamples sorted by WW Index. The results are again
similar to the previous one, that stock mispricing reduces patent-based efficiency only
in the subsample with low financial constraint, and citation-based efficiency in the
subsamples with medium and low level of financial constraint. Moreover, the effect of
mispricing is monotonically decreasing with financial constraint. In other word, price
efficiency has a stronger effect on innovative efficiency as firms have more financial
slack.
The above results are not consistent with the financing effect hypothesis, as stock
mispricing affect innovative efficiency exactly when financial constraint is not binding.
However, this finding can be consistent with the market feedback explanation. Since
firms need the financial slack to be able to adjust their investment when they receive
informative signals from stock prices, it is likely that firms benefit more from market
feedback when they are financially unconstrained (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2006).
Therefore, the evidences thus far are supportive of the market feedback hypothesis
but not the financing effect hypothesis.
1.4.3 Managerial Incentive
Price efficiency may enhance real efficiency by incentivizing the manager. From the
literature on optimal incentive contracts (e.g., Holmström, 1979), we would expect
managers to be offered stronger incentive contracts when the firm’s stock price is
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informative and provides a more precise reflection of firm value.13 As manager’s
compensation is tied to firm value, managers will have a stronger incentive to take
value-maximizing actions for the firms. On the other hand, it has been argued in
the literature that the stock markets coupled with strong incentives can distort the
investment process and induce managerial myopia (Stein, 1988). Managers, in an
attempt to boost short term price rises may forgo long term investments to boost short
term performance and, as a result, compromise investment in innovative activities.
Since a more informative stock price also facilitates stock market learning, we
might expect incentives and stock market learning to be complementary mechanisms
through which the stock market affects real efficiency, including R&D investment. As
Bond et al. (2012) have discussed, both effects relate to the informational role of
stock prices. Incentivized managers may also pay more attention to the stock prices
and, as a consequence, extract more information from stock prices.
We study the role of incentive contracts in the real effect of price efficiency on
innovative efficiency. Specifically, we use CEO’s scaled wealth-performance sensitivity
developed by Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009) as the empirical proxy for the
strength of managerial incentives. It measures the change in the wealth of the CEO
when there is a one-hundred-percentage change in firm value, scaled by annual pay.14
Similar to Section 1.4.1 and 1.4.2, we sort the sample into tertiles based on scaled
wealth-performance sensitivity. The estimates are reported in Table 8. Due to limited
data availability on CEO compensation, the sample size here is substantially smaller
than that in the previous sections. Nevertheless, we still find a significantly negative
effect of stock mispricing on innovative efficiency in all the subsamples when focusing
on citations as the innovation measure. However, there is no significant trend in
13Holmström and Tirole (1993) develop a model to argue that not only are strong incentive
contracts optimal when stock prices are more efficient, but also that strong incentive contracts can
induce managers to enhance stock price efficiency.
14The data is available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~aedmans/data.html
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the effect of stock mispricing across tertiles. For example, in columns 4 to 6, the
coefficient on the interaction between Ln(R&D) and Pressure is -0.297 for firms in
the top tertile while that is -0.286 for firms in the bottom tertile. The insignificant
difference in the effect of price mispricing across subsamples suggest that incentive
mechanism cannot fully explain the effect of price efficiency on innovative efficiency.
1.4.4 Market Short Termism
Another possible mechanism through which stock price affects real efficiency is that
managers irrationally follow the stock price. There are two explanations for this
behavior. One reason for the irrational behavior is market timing, that firms are
able to raise capital when stock is overvalued (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003; Gao
and Lou, 2013). This explanation, however, has been ruled out since we find stock
mispricing affect innovative efficiency only when firms are not constrained financially.
Another explanation for the behavioral bias is that managers follow the stock
price to cater to current sentiment (Polk and Sapienza, 2009). When the stock price
is driven by short term investor, stock price may cause managerial myopia as manager
forgo long term investment opportunities to boost short term stock price (Stein, 1988).
Managers may take on negative NPV projects when the stock is over-priced and forgo
positive NPV projects when the stock is under-priced.
As suggested by Stein (1996) and Polk and Sapienza (2009), the catering behavior
is more likely to take place when the shareholder horizon is short. Under this hy-
pothesis, stock price should have a stronger effect on innovative efficiency with larger
holding by short term investor and less holder by long term investors. To test this, we
look into the type of shareholders holding the stocks. First, we check whether firms
have blockholders. Blockholders are deemed to be long term investors and play a
more active role in governance. Edmans (2009), for example, shows that blockholders
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can mitigate managerial myopia. The rationale is that blockholders, who are less sub-
ject to short-sale constraints compared to other shareholders, have greater incentive
to acquire information and monitor managers by trading on information. As a result,
blockholders will incorporate more information about the fundamental value of the
firms into stock prices and will be less sensitive to short-term performance.
We compare between firms with or without blockholders in terms of the effect of
stock mispricing on innovative efficiency. To do this we estimate Model (4) in the two
subsamples based on presence of blockholders. Results reported in Table 9 show that
the interaction between Ln(R&D) and Pressure is significant only among firms with
blockholders. This is inconsistent with catering mechanism as blockholders tend to
have longer horizon.
Next, we follow Bushee’s (1998) classification of institutional investors: dedicated
investors who have concentrated portfolios and low portfolio turnover; quasi-indexers
who have diversified portfolios and low turnover; and transient investors who have
diversified portfolios and high turnover. Among the three categories, transient in-
vestors have short-term horizon while dedicated investors and quasi-indexers have
longer horizon. If stock mispricing affect innovative efficiency due to managers’ cater-
ing behavior, then the effect is expect to be increasing with the ownership of transient
investors. We define transient investors as short term investors and group dedicated
investors and quasi-indexers as long term investors and examine how their ownership
interacts with the effect of stock mispricing on innovative efficiency.
For this test, we need to include the ownership by both type of investors since
they are highly correlated across firms.15 We add triple interactions among Ln(R&D),
Pressure, and long-term or short-term investor ownership. We also control for the
pair-wise interactions among all these variables in the regression. If catering behav-
ior is what explains the relation between mispricing and innovative efficiency, then
15The correlation between long term investor and short term investors is 0.52 in our sample.
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Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure × Short-Term Investor Ownership should be significantly
negative.
We show the estimates in Table 10. While Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure × Long-Term
Investor Ownership is significantly negative, Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure × Short-Term
Investor Ownership is not. This suggests that the effect of mispricing on innovative
efficiency is increasing with the ownership of long-term investors but not short-term
investors. This is again not consistent with the market short termism hypothesis
since the presence of short term investors does not cause larger negative effect of
mispricing.
However, we believe that the above finding is again consistent with market feed-
back hypothesis. Blockholders and long-term investors can promote stock market
learning by acting as patient shareholders that are less sensitive to short term per-
formance. When managers receive positive signal from the stock price, they can act
upon by increasing the investment without worrying about past underperformance.
Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) find that higher institutional ownership is
related to more corporate innovation and they argue that institutional investors en-
courage more innovation by mitigating managers’ short term career risk. Therefore, it
is likely that long-term investors increase the real effect of stock prices by facilitating
market learning.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper examines whether price efficiency improve innovative efficiency. We find
that stock price inefficiency caused by exogenous mutual fund fire sales or purchases
reduces efficiency of future R&D investment. This relation is robust after controlling
for a number of firm and industry characteristics. The relation is stronger when
market feedback is deemed to be more important. Specifically, stock mispricing has
greater effect on innovative efficiency when managers have less insider information,
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receive less information from peers’ stock prices, or when the firm is fundamentally
less correlated with peer firms. Therefore, our findings suggests that stock markets
improve real efficiency by serving as a means of aggregating investors’ information
and providing managers with “feedback” that guides their investment decisions.
Several alternative explanations are examined and seem unlikely to explain the
above relation. First, the endogeneity of mutual fund trading is not likely to explain
our findings since both positive and negative price pressure caused by mutual fund
flow lead to lower innovative efficiency. Second, the effect of stock mispricing on
innovative efficiency does not come through financing since the relation between stock
mispricing and innovative efficiency is concentrated among financially unconstrained
firms. Third, managerial incentive cannot fully explain the results since the relation
between stock mispricing and innovative efficiency does not vary significantly based on
managers’ wealth-performance sensitivity. Finally, the real effect of price inefficiency
is unlikely to be driven by market short termism since the effect increases with the
ownership of long term investors but not short term investors.
Our evidence is supportive of the idea that stock markets recognize the value
of future R&D investment opportunities and provide valuable feedback to managers.
This finding contributes to the debate as to whether stock markets facilitate or hinder
innovative activities or other types of long-term investment. This study has potential
policy implications as regulations that aim to improve the information environment
of the financial market may have a significant impact on the efficiency of innovative
activities. Hence, financial markets have an economic role to play beyond that of
simply providing financing. Our paper also suggests that an under-appreciated cost
of stock market disruptions may be the poorer investment decisions by firms when
there is an interruption in the market-feedback channel.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics For Chapter 1.
This table presents summary statistics of the main variables used in our analyses. We winsorize all
the variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All the variables are defined in the Appendix.
N Mean Median Std. Dev.
Ln(Patent) 86,180 0.511 0.000 1.052
Ln(Citation) 86,180 1.029 0.000 1.983
Ln(R&D) 86,180 1.014 0.000 1.524
Pressure 86,180 0.035 0.000 0.103
Positive Pressure 86,180 0.020 0.000 0.079
Negative Pressure 86,180 0.019 0.000 0.078
Ln(Assets) 86,180 4.734 4.600 2.068
Leverage 86,180 0.227 0.186 0.217
CAPEX 86,180 0.088 0.049 0.126
Tangibility 86,180 0.273 0.209 0.222
ROA 86,180 -0.076 0.028 0.380
Q 86,180 2.133 1.475 1.932
SA Index 86,180 1.402 1.404 1.971
Herfindahl 86,180 0.220 0.171 0.169
Absolute Earnings Announcement CAR 63,457 0.073 0.060 0.055
PIN of Peer Firms (SIC3) 74,515 0.185 0.181 0.045
PIN of Peer Firms (TNIC3) 34,686 0.158 0.154 0.047
Absolute Stock Corr. with Peer Firms (SIC3) 70,098 0.365 0.358 0.218
Absolute Stock Corr. with Peer Firms (TNIC3) 39,812 0.375 0.370 0.221
WW Index 80,541 -0.225 -0.223 0.128
Wealth-Performance Sensitivity 19,892 41.645 7.598 132.239
Blockholder 86,180 0.592 1.000 0.492
Short-Term Investor Ownership 86,180 0.081 0.042 0.100
Long-Term Investor Ownership 86,180 0.248 0.196 0.218
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Table 2: Mutual Fund Flow-driven Price Pressure and Innovative Efficiency.
This table presents estimates from firm fixed effects regressions where the dependent vari-
ables are measures of future innovation output and the independent variable of interest is
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure. The following control variables are also included in the regressions:
Ln(Assets), Leverage, CAPEX, Tangibility, ROA, Q, SA Index, Herfindahl, and Herfindahl2.
Year fixed effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors
are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variables: Ln(Pat)t+1 Ln(Pat)t+2 Ln(Pat)t+3 Ln(Cite)t+1 Ln(Cite)t+2 Ln(Cite)t+3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure 0.005 -0.040** -0.048** -0.188*** -0.360*** -0.316***
(0.33) (-2.37) (-2.57) (-6.36) (-11.01) (-8.48)
Ln(R&D)t+1 0.157*** 0.215*** 0.160*** 0.231*** 0.343*** 0.220***
(16.44) (19.83) (15.61) (14.09) (18.65) (12.70)
Pressure -0.025 -0.016 -0.005 0.005 -0.006 0.042
(-1.28) (-0.79) (-0.23) (0.10) (-0.12) (0.82)
Ln(Assets) 0.165*** 0.129*** 0.105*** 0.120** 0.062 0.047
(4.78) (3.72) (2.81) (2.08) (1.07) (0.74)
Leverage -0.111*** -0.114*** -0.125*** -0.334*** -0.342*** -0.347***
(-5.18) (-5.18) (-5.29) (-6.84) (-6.88) (-6.71)
CAPEX -0.057*** -0.017 0.008 -0.062 0.041 0.067
(-2.93) (-0.86) (0.40) (-1.34) (0.87) (1.37)
Tangibility 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.083*** 0.284*** 0.297*** 0.286***
(3.10) (3.25) (2.63) (4.27) (4.39) (3.98)
ROA -0.014 -0.004 0.009 -0.048** -0.052** -0.003
(-1.56) (-0.41) (1.03) (-2.07) (-2.24) (-0.15)
Q 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.024***
(6.76) (6.37) (5.53) (7.29) (6.64) (4.80)
SA Index 0.079** 0.079** 0.063* -0.045 -0.020 -0.009
(2.29) (2.30) (1.69) (-0.78) (-0.34) (-0.14)
Herfindahl 0.076 0.117 0.095 0.257 0.226 0.200
(0.92) (1.43) (1.12) (1.51) (1.28) (1.06)
Herfindahl2 -0.038 -0.082 -0.072 -0.221 -0.218 -0.206
(-0.40) (-0.90) (-0.78) (-1.20) (-1.15) (-1.02)
Constant -0.543** -0.431** -0.239 0.413 0.538 0.724*
(-2.52) (-2.02) (-1.03) (1.15) (1.50) (1.85)
Adjusted R2 0.836 0.823 0.808 0.728 0.709 0.691
Observations 86,180 82,749 79,245 86,180 82,749 79,245
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Insider Information, Mutual Fund Flow-driven Price Pressure and Innovative Efficiency.
In this table, we sort firms into tertiles based on the absolute value of earnings announcement
CAR as a measure of insider information and estimate Model (4) in the three subsamples. The
dependent variables are measures of future innovation output and the independent variable of
interest is Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure. The following control variables are also included in the
regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage, CAPEX, Tangibility, ROA, Q, SA Index, Herfindahl, and
Herfindahl2. Year fixed effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard
errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variables: Ln(Patent)t+2 Ln(Citation)t+2
Subsample: High Medium Low High Medium Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure -0.021 -0.067* -0.034 -0.243*** -0.328*** -0.400***
(-0.76) (-1.89) (-0.88) (-3.99) (-4.91) (-5.27)
Ln(R&D)t+1 0.186*** 0.244*** 0.248*** 0.325*** 0.340*** 0.361***
(12.01) (10.14) (8.29) (9.73) (8.18) (7.72)
Pressure -0.016 -0.017 0.023 0.033 0.033 0.056
(-0.37) (-0.39) (0.48) (0.30) (0.34) (0.50)
Adjusted R2 0.797 0.823 0.860 0.662 0.714 0.775
Observations 20612 19844 19973 20612 19844 19973
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Peer Stock Price Informativeness, Mutual Fund Flow-driven Price Pressure and Innovative
Efficiency.
We sort firms into tertiles based on the average PIN of peer firms, defined as firms in the
same 3-digit SIC industry (Panel A) or firms in the same TNIC3 industry (Panel B) and
estimate Model (4) in the three subsamples. The dependent variables are measures of fu-
ture innovation output and the independent variable of interest is Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure.
The following control variables are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Lever-
age, CAPEX, Tangibility, ROA, Q, SA Index, Herfindahl, and Herfindahl2. Year fixed
effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors are in
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: PIN of Peer Firms (SIC3)
Dependent Variables: Ln(Patent)t+2 Ln(Citation)t+2
Subsample: High Medium Low High Medium Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure 0.009 0.018 -0.053** -0.018 -0.122 -0.313***
(0.20) (0.51) (-2.25) (-0.19) (-1.58) (-6.73)
Ln(R&D)t+1 0.240*** 0.200*** 0.191*** 0.464*** 0.369*** 0.302***
(10.26) (11.83) (9.17) (9.92) (10.65) (9.05)
Pressure 0.033 0.002 0.057* 0.082 -0.082 0.151*
(0.69) (0.05) (1.70) (0.72) (-0.71) (1.84)
Adjusted R2 0.832 0.853 0.848 0.745 0.749 0.730
Observations 25337 24791 24387 25337 24791 24387
Panel B: PIN of Peer Firms (TNIC3)
Dependent Variables: Ln(Patent)t+2 Ln(Citation)t+2
Subsample: High Medium Low High Medium Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure 0.004 -0.050 -0.057 -0.171 -0.253*** -0.300***
(0.06) (-1.32) (-1.54) (-1.15) (-2.78) (-4.30)
Ln(R&D)t+1 0.143*** 0.138*** 0.202*** 0.278*** 0.246*** 0.306***
(4.83) (5.76) (6.52) (3.99) (4.94) (5.87)
Pressure -0.013 0.095 0.002 -0.079 0.068 0.031
(-0.17) (1.51) (0.04) (-0.46) (0.46) (0.25)
Adjusted R2 0.865 0.851 0.870 0.755 0.744 0.755
Observations 11794 11446 11446 11794 11446 11446
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
32
Table 6: Stock Performance Correlation With Peer Firms, Mutual Fund Flow-driven Price Pressure
and Innovative Efficiency.
We sort firms into tertiles based on the firm’s correlation with peer firms in terms of stock
performance. Peer firms are defined as firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry or in the same TNIC3
industry. The dependent variables are measures of future innovation output and the independent
variable of interest is Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure. The following control variables are also included
in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage, CAPEX, Tangibility, ROA, Q, SA Index, Herfindahl, and
Herfindahl2. Year fixed effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard
errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Return Correlation with Peer Firms (SIC3)
Dependent Variables: Ln(Patent)t+2 Ln(Citation)t+2
Subsample: High Medium Low High Medium Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure -0.008 -0.061 -0.077 -0.252*** -0.417*** -0.395***
(-0.31) (-1.61) (-1.60) (-4.77) (-5.63) (-3.77)
Ln(R&D)t+1 0.240*** 0.221*** 0.207*** 0.365*** 0.339*** 0.345***
(12.19) (9.95) (8.49) (10.35) (8.08) (7.78)
Pressure 0.038 -0.056 -0.025 0.227** -0.199* -0.058
(0.93) (-1.16) (-0.47) (2.39) (-1.75) (-0.44)
Adjusted R2 0.834 0.817 0.820 0.722 0.703 0.699
Observations 22706 22143 22208 22706 22143 22208
Panel B: Return Correlation with Peer Firms (TNIC3)
Dependent Variables: Ln(Patent)t+2 Ln(Citation)t+2
Subsample: High Medium Low High Medium Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure -0.022 -0.079** -0.088 -0.267*** -0.447*** -0.419***
(-0.74) (-2.13) (-1.60) (-4.15) (-5.47) (-3.29)
Ln(R&D)t+1 0.172*** 0.152*** 0.180*** 0.252*** 0.219*** 0.265***
(6.97) (4.22) (5.05) (5.32) (3.42) (4.43)
Pressure 0.044 -0.047 0.004 0.080 -0.046 -0.040
(0.91) (-0.79) (0.07) (0.69) (-0.33) (-0.26)
Adjusted R2 0.863 0.853 0.840 0.733 0.719 0.702
Observations 12542 12183 12220 12542 12183 12220
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Financial Constraint, Mutual Fund Flow-driven Price Pressure and Innovative Efficiency.
In this table, we sort firms into tertiles based on SA Index (Panel A) or WW Index (Panel
B) and estimate Model (4) in the three subsamples. The dependent variables are measures of
future innovation output and the independent variable of interest is Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure.
The following control variables are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Lever-
age, CAPEX, Tangibility, ROA, Q, SA Index, Herfindahl, and Herfindahl2. Year fixed
effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors are in
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Subsample Based on SA Index
Dependent Variables: Ln(Patent)t+2 Ln(Citation)t+2
Subsample: High Medium Low High Medium Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure -0.049 -0.028 -0.049** -0.175 -0.216*** -0.338***
(-0.63) (-0.98) (-2.47) (-0.97) (-3.38) (-8.97)
Ln(R&D)t+1 0.129*** 0.164*** 0.257*** 0.277*** 0.339*** 0.403***
(10.87) (14.60) (12.02) (9.46) (12.65) (12.04)
Pressure -0.006 -0.022 0.024 -0.184 -0.065 0.097
(-0.09) (-0.68) (0.84) (-1.01) (-0.80) (1.52)
Adjusted R2 0.581 0.727 0.874 0.498 0.630 0.805
Observations 28689 27347 26713 28689 27347 26713
Panel B: Subsample Based on WW Index
Dependent Variables: Ln(Patent)t+2 Ln(Citation)t+2
Subsample: High Medium Low High Medium Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure -0.012 -0.031 -0.053** -0.080 -0.257*** -0.353***
(-0.16) (-1.03) (-2.35) (-0.48) (-3.97) (-8.53)
Ln(R&D)t+1 0.131*** 0.188*** 0.255*** 0.259*** 0.352*** 0.378***
(11.49) (14.31) (10.65) (8.91) (11.35) (10.17)
Pressure 0.090 -0.041 0.022 0.173 -0.091 0.074
(1.27) (-1.22) (0.72) (0.93) (-1.09) (1.08)
Adjusted R2 0.628 0.733 0.872 0.504 0.633 0.802
Observations 26741 25511 24934 26741 25511 24934
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8: Managerial Incentive, Mutual Fund Flow-driven Price Pressure and Innovative Efficiency.
In this table, we sort firms into tertiles based on CEO’s Wealth-Performance Sensitivity and
estimate Model (4) in the three subsamples. The dependent variables are measures of fu-
ture innovation output and the independent variable of interest is Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure.
The following control variables are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Lever-
age, CAPEX, Tangibility, ROA, Q, SA Index, Herfindahl, and Herfindahl2. Year fixed
effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors are in
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variables: Ln(Patent)t+2 Ln(Citation)t+2
Subsample: High Medium Low High Medium Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure -0.013 -0.054 -0.062 -0.297*** -0.331*** -0.286***
(-0.35) (-1.47) (-1.39) (-4.06) (-4.67) (-3.07)
Ln(R&D)t+1 0.120*** 0.334*** 0.226*** 0.163** 0.502*** 0.366***
(3.04) (8.08) (6.43) (2.48) (7.29) (4.97)
Pressure -0.026 0.046 0.019 0.075 0.250 0.093
(-0.49) (0.72) (0.28) (0.62) (1.64) (0.60)
Adjusted R2 0.904 0.889 0.868 0.830 0.812 0.790
Observations 6393 6177 5942 6393 6177 5942
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 9: Blockholders, Mutual Fund Flow-driven Price Pressure and Innovative Efficiency.
In this table, we estimate Model (4) in the subsamples for firms with or without blockholders.
The dependent variables are measures of future innovation output and the independent variable
of interest is Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure. The following control variables are also included in
the regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage, CAPEX, Tangibility, ROA, Q, SA Index, Herfindahl, and
Herfindahl2. Year fixed effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard
errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variables: Ln(Patent)t+2 Ln(Citation)t+2
Subsample: With Without With Without
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure -0.059*** 0.061 -0.367*** -0.130
(-3.12) (1.43) (-10.29) (-1.46)
Ln(R&D)t+1 0.218*** 0.192*** 0.341*** 0.331***
(17.35) (8.97) (14.83) (9.20)
Pressure -0.011 -0.071 0.051 -0.271*
(-0.47) (-1.16) (0.95) (-1.82)
Adjusted R2 0.820 0.853 0.711 0.737
Observations 48204 34545 48204 34545
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 10: Investor Horizon, Mutual Fund Flow-driven Price Pressure and Innovative Efficiency.
This table presents estimates from firm fixed effects regressions where the dependent vari-
ables are measures of future innovation output and the independent variable of interest is
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure × Short-Term Investor Ownership and Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure ×
Long-Term Investor Ownership. The following control variables are also included in the regressions:
Ln(Assets), Leverage, CAPEX, Tangibility, ROA, Q, SA Index, Herfindahl, and Herfindahl2.
Year fixed effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors
are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variables: Ln(Patent)t+2 Ln(Citation)t+2
(1) (2)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure × Short-Term Investor Ownership -0.106 0.145
(-0.74) (0.54)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Pressure × Long-Term Investor Ownership -0.203** -0.819***
(-2.02) (-4.42)




Pressure × Short-Term Investor Ownership 0.065 0.099
(0.36) (0.23)
Pressure × Long-Term Investor Ownership 0.289** 1.003***
(2.58) (3.83)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Short-Term Investor Ownership 0.057* -0.055
(1.72) (-0.86)
Ln(R&D)t+1 × Long-Term Investor Ownership 0.038 -0.374***
(1.63) (-9.05)
Short-Term Investor Ownership -0.122*** -0.116
(-2.95) (-1.18)




Adjusted R2 0.823 0.711
Observations 82749 82749
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
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Figure 1: CAR after Fire Sale
In this figure, we present the three-month moving average of cumulative abnormal return of stocks
after mutual fund flow-driven sale.
Figure 2: CAR after Fire Purchase
In this figure, we present the three-month moving average of cumulative abnormal return of stocks
after mutual fund flow-driven purchase.
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CHAPTER II
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS: PATENTING VS. SECRECY
2.1 Introduction
Intellectual property (IP), whether in the form of patents or confidential information
about customers or production processes, is the source of much of the value created
by firms. This is particularly the case in advanced economies where innovation and
the production of IP are substantial drivers of economic growth. The manner in
which IP is protected and innovators rewarded for their creations remains a matter of
debate. After a new product or process is discovered, its inventor can decide to keep
the invention secret, with the risk of it being developed elsewhere or surreptitiously
copied. Alternatively, patent protection can be sought and the invention disclosed.
Patents can be regarded as a contract between society and the inventor: society ben-
efits from the disclosure and the inventor obtain exclusive rights over the technology
for a period of time.1 Whether firms choose to patent or to keep their inventions se-
cret will depend on factors such as the extent to which patent rights are enforced, the
costs of firm opacity and of maintaining secrets. In the paper we study the trade-offs
patenting firms make in terms of disclosure and patenting decisions. In particular,
we study the effect of exogenous events that shift the trade-off between alternative
modes of IP protection. We develop and test hypotheses with regard to the impact
on firms’ patenting propensity, their financing policies and various attributes such as
1The patent protection period in the US is now 20 years from the filing date of the patent
application as a result of legislation to implement WTO agreements. Historically, patents were
disclosed publicly only after they had been granted. This has changed, however, and the requirement
under the American Inventors Protection Act of 1998 is that patent applications be disclosed to
public 18 months after the filing date.
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its stock liquidity.
Protecting intellectual property can be costly and both modes – patenting and
secrecy – have their drawbacks. Even when a firm can receive a patent for its in-
vention, it faces the cost of renewing its patent and the threat of litigation. The
disclosure that the patent requires can also leave the firm vulnerable to imitation or
inventing around the patent by its competitors. Keeping a discovery secret provides
a form of IP for many firms that either choose not to or cannot patent their discover-
ies. Interestingly, surveys suggest that in many industries secrecy is considered more
important than patents as a means of protecting IP (Scherer, et al., 1959; Taylor
and Silberston, 1973; Mansfield, 1986; Levin, et al., 1987; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh,
2000). Trade secrets, by way of contrast to patents, must be held in confidence if they
are to be protected. The nature of trade secret protection is also narrower. A firm can
only sue for trade secret theft someone who misappropriated its idea, not someone
who made the same discovery independently. Consistent with this suggestion, Lerner
(1995) finds that small firms are much less likely to patent in subclasses where large
firms and those with extensive litigation experience have already patented. Friedman,
Landes, and Posner (1991) suggest that firms may employ trade secrecy because it is
more cost-effective than seeking formal protection. Firms that innovate infrequently
may consequently eschew these forms of protection, and rely instead on trade secrecy.
The level of patent protection will affect a firm’s decision on whether (or not)
to patent and, hence, whether (or not) to disclose its technological progress. To the
extent this affects the information available to outside investors this may also affect
the cost of equity capital. For innovative firms, information asymmetry between
insiders and outside investors tends to be higher because it is more difficult for the
outsiders to value R&D investments compared to ordinary investments (Leland and
Pyle, 1977). This can lead to a greater adverse selection cost in stock market trading,
giving rise to lower stock liquidity and higher cost of capital for patenting firms
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(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002; Easley and O’Hara, 2003). A number
of studies in the literature have documented the informational role of patent grants
in financing. For example, through interviews with a variety of practitioners and
investors in the software industry, Mann (2005) finds that venture capitalists often
take into account the information from patents of the portfolio firms in making their
investment decisions. Moreover, Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2012)
use stock market reaction to news about patents to assess the economic value of
innovations, suggesting that patent grants do provide new information to the stock
market.
We hypothesize that strong patent rights protection would be expected to encour-
age firm to increase patenting and, consequently, reduce information asymmetry.2
Further, the reduction in information asymmetry on the patenting would lead to
firm’s stock becoming more liquid. We expect the greater liquidity to attract more
institutional investors and, in turn, more accurate analyst forecast. The firms that
benefit from an increase in liquidity may be more willing to raise capital in the form
of equity financing. Smaller firms with lower market share, that may have been un-
willing to litigate to protect their patents in the past, are likely to be the firms that
are more strongly affected by the strengthening of patent protection.
IP protection can also be strengthened by giving firms greater ability to sue for
the disclosure or misuse of a firm’s confidential information. Interestingly, the impli-
cations of strengthening of trade secrecy protection are quite the reverse of greater
protection of patents. In particular, we might expect firms to pull back on their
patenting (even if there is no drop off in the level of innovation). They may also be
more reluctant to releases other types of information. The overall effect will be to
reduce their liquidity. The greater opacity as a result of a greater reliance on secrecy
2Given the lower cost of disclosing information overall, firms can also choose to disclose informa-
tion in other ways, such as voluntary earnings forecast which will be discussed in later section.
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could reduce the extent to which the firm is followed by analysts and held by insti-
tutional investors. However, because this the result of firms optimally choosing to
reduce information disclosure, we would not usually expect there to be a drop in firm
value or in the extent of innovation R&D expenses.
To test our hypotheses, we exploit two sets of natural experiments created by the
passage of laws or their implementation. The first is the increased protection that
was provided to trade secrets across different states over a number of years. Since
these changes occurred at different points in time, this allows us to identify the effect
of these changes on firm financing and transparency. The second major exogenous
change we study is the implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This had the effect of providing significantly
greater intellectual protection to patents across the globe.
However, before turning to these two natural experiments, we examine an illus-
trative case: that of the effect of patent protection in the context of a particular
industry, semiconductor manufacturing. The interesting feature of this industry, as
documented by Hall and Ziedonis (2001) is that this was an industry that tended
to rely largely on trade secrecy, but moved over time to a much greater usage of
patents to protect IP. This change occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s on account
of events such as the establishment of a centralized Court of Appeals that favored
stronger patent protection and the resolution of a certain influential cases. Consistent
with our hypotheses, we show that this shift toward patenting in the semiconductor
industry was accompanied by a substantial increase in liquidity of the stocks of the
industry firms. Our control group here is the chemical-pharmaceutical industry that
exhibited relatively little change in its patenting activity and the liquidity of its firms’
stocks.
We first examine the implication of trade secret protection to stock liquidity. Using
the staggered enactment of trade secret statute to exploit the exogenous variation in
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trade secret protection, we find that stronger trade secret protection causes lower stock
liquidity. Furthermore, we find that stronger trade secret protection is related to lower
analyst forecast quality in terms of dispersion and accuracy, suggesting that trade
secret protection encourage more secrecy and thus increases information asymmetry
and reduces stock liquidity.
We further find that trade secrets protection has a greater effect on small firms.
Small firms in terms of total assets or market share reduced patenting after the enact-
ment of trade secret statue, indicating that they substituted trade secrets for patent-
ing. Meanwhile, small firms experience greater decrease in stock liquidity compared
to larger firms with stronger trade secrets protection. As small firms are more reliant
on secrecy for protecting their IP (Friedman, Landes, and Posner, 1991; Lerner, 1995),
stronger trade secret protection results in greater increase in information asymmetry
and drop in stock liquidity among small firms.
Lower stock liquidity can induce financing friction by increasing cost of equity
capital (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002; Easley and O’Hara, 2003).
Our analysis suggests that this is the case when trade secrets statute is introduced.
We find that small firms are more likely to raise equity capital after stronger trade
secrets protection, possibly due to better investment opportunity with stronger trade
secret protection. However, we show that seasoned equity offerings (SEO) after the
enactment of trade secret statute received more negative stock market reaction, sug-
gesting that raising equity capital become more costly after the enactment of trade
secrets statute. Overall, we find that stronger trade secrets protection impede financ-
ing by causing more information asymmetry in the stock market and reducing stock
liquidity.
Next, we exploit an exogenous change in patent protection caused by the imple-
mentation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and its impact on firm’s stock liquidity and equity finance by exploiting.
42
Using difference-in-differences approach, we find that an exogenous increase in the
level of patent rights protection due to TRIPS enhances stock liquidity for patenting
firms. The effect is economically significant. For example, in a three-year period
surrounding the effective day of TRIPS implementation in the US, the bid-ask spread
of treatment firms who had applied for patents in 1993 or 1994 (treatment group)
decreased by 5.1%, while that of the matched control group has no significant change
during the same period. Supporting the idea that increased patenting reduces infor-
mation asymmetry, we find that patenting firms have better information environment
in terms of lower analysts’ forecast dispersion and error after TRIPS.
To distinguish the causal effect of TRIPS on stock liquidity from other confound-
ing events, we examine the heterogeneity of the effect among treatment firms. We
find that the effect is greater for firms in industries with higher reliance on export,
consistent with the fact that TRIPS is designed to protect intellectual property in
international trade. We also show that industries that find trade secret less effective
are more affected by TRIPS in terms of stock liquidity, suggesting that firms benefit
more from TRIPS where there is no effective alternative to patenting.
Moreover, we find that among patenting firms, small firms in terms of total assets
or market share, as well as financially constrained firms in terms of access to public
debt or dividend policy, experienced greater increase in stock liquidity compared to
large firms around the implementation of TRIPS. These firms are more likely to raise
equity capital after TRIPS. Meanwhile, SEOs after TRIPS receive better market
reaction. These findings are supportive of the prediction that patent protection is
more important for small firms and patent protection helps reduce financing friction.
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on finance and innovation (Hall
and Lerner, 2009). There is a growing number of studies on the influence of different
types of financing arrangement to corporate innovation (e.g. Atanassov, Nanda, and
Seru, 2007; Chava, Oettl, Subramanian, and Subramanian, 2012; Chava, Nanda, and
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Xiao, 2013; Tian and Wang, 2011; etc.). Our paper, by contrast, studies how legal
protection of intellectual property affects firms’ financing. We find that while stronger
secrecy protection reduces stock liquidity and impedes financing, stronger patent pro-
tection facilitates firms’ equity financing by improving stock liquidity. Easier access
to capital allows firms to invest more on innovative activities and enhance productiv-
ity. Bena and Garlappi (2012) show that imperfect competition in innovation causes
laggard firms to have higher cost of capital. Our paper complements their study
by showing that stronger IPR protection benefits small (and possibly laggard) firms
more in improving their stock liquidity and reducing cost of capital. Our paper is also
supportive of the notion that stock liquidity is endogenously determined given the
cost and benefit (Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Ljungqvist, 2013; Dass, Nanda,
and Xiao, 2013). As is shown in our paper, when patent protection improves, cost of
maintaining high stock liquidity decreases and stock liquidity increases in equilibrium.
Our paper also adds to the literature on intellectual property.3 The enforcement
of intellectual property protection is shown to contribute to economic growth (Gould
and Gruben, 1996; Park and Ginarte, 1997; Falvey, Foster, and Greenaway, 2006).
Potential mechanisms that has been discussed in the literature includes the effect of
IPR protection on future innovation and R&D strategy (Taylor, 1994; Zhao, 2006;
Lerner, 2009), technology transfer (Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley, 2006), interna-
tional trade (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995), and foreign direct investment (Lee and
Mansfield, 1996; Glass and Saggi, 2002), etc. A few studies examine the implication
of intellectual property protection to financing. Mann (2005) discusses the role of
patent in financing in the software industry. He finds evidence that venture capi-
talists take into account the value of patents a portfolio firm holds when investing.
Sichelman and Graham (2010) conduct a large survey among startups and find that
3Please refer to Jaffe (2000), Gallini (2002), and Ziedonis (2010) for comprehensive survey of the
literature on intellectual property right.
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many firms rely on patents to improve the chance of financing. Hsu and Ziedonis
(2008) study venture-backed semiconductor firms and find that patenting is associ-
ated with higher funding-round valuations. All these papers suggest the importance
of patents in raising venture capital.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically study the impli-
cations of intellectual property protection to equity financing for public firms. This
is an important question not only because equity financing plays an more important
role for innovative public firms, but also innovative firms face greater challenge in
equity financing due to information asymmetry regarding innovative activities. Our
findings provide policy makers and academic researchers with a new perspective for
the discussion and future development of IP protection law.
2.2 IP Protection: Natural Experiments
We discuss the two exogenous shifts that occurred in IP protection that we exploit to
test our hypotheses: (i) The greater protection of trade secrecy that took place over
the years in various US states; (ii) The passage of the TRIPS, with the greater global
protection provided to patents. We begin, however, by discussing the illustrative case
of the semiconductor manufacturing industry, that experienced a large shift from
reliance on secrecy to patenting over the course of the 1990s.
2.2.1 An Illustrative Case: Semiconductor Industry Shift from Secrecy
to Patenting
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) discusses why the rise in patents during the 1990s may
reflect, to some extent, an increase in the propensity to patent due to patent reform
– even if the policy changes did not necessarily enhance the development of these
inventions. They find support for their conjecture in the semiconductor industry,
based on data from 110 semiconductor firms during 1975 to 1996, and interviews with
managers and executives. Due to the short product life cycles and the fast pace of
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technological change, semiconductor firms had relied heavily on secrecy and lead time
instead of patents to protect their intellectual property. This changed over time on
account of the creation of the centralized Court of Appeals. By enforcing patents more
strongly, Hall and Ziedonis argue, the court incentivized inventors to extract royalties
from prospective infringers by litigation. There were also important “demonstration
effects” associated with the successful patent litigation of Texas Instruments and
Polaroid in 1985 and 1986.
We present the greater reliance on patenting in the semi-conductor industry in
Figure 3. Our comparison industry here is the patenting per firm done by Chemical
-Pharmaceutical industry. The Chemical-Pharmaceutical industry has long relied
more on patenting than secrecy, as has been noted in various cross-industry surveys [].
The reason has to do with the ability to characterize the new produce (or “molecule”)
better than in many other industries. As we see, there is little change over time in
the per-firm patenting activity in this industry compared to the substantial increase
in patenting by the semiconductor firms.
In Figure 4 we present the levels of stock illiquidity of the firms in these two
industries. As can be seen, there is reactively little change in the liquidity, as indi-
cated by Amihud-Mendelson and Turnover measures, of the stocks in the Chemical-
Pharmaceutical industry. There is, however, a substantial improvement in the liq-
uidity of the semi-conductor industry firms over this time. Observe that the liquidity
appears to track well the increase in patent grants in the industry. Regression results
that relate firm-level liquidity to patent grants over this time are consistent with the
graphical patterns.4
Overall, we consider the pattern to be supportive of our hypotheses. However,
the changes took place gradually over time as the patents became more attractive for
the semi-conductor industry. We will now turn to exogenous shifts in the costs and
4The regression results are unreported for brevity and are available upon request.
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benefits in the firm of IP protection that are more sharply defined in terms of when
the events occurred. The greater time specificity in terms of the events has the benefit
of reducing possible uncertainty in terms relating the changes to the exogenous shifts.
2.2.2 Trade Secrets Law
Trade secrets in the US have historically been protected by common law. In 1979,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws published the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which provides a comprehensive statute on trade
secrets protection for enactment by the states.5 The UTSA improves the trade secret
protection in three aspects: substantive law, procedures, and remedies (Png, 2014).
As each state has different level of trade secrets protection under common law and
state trade secrets statute improves the protection to different extent, Png (2014)
compiles an index specifying six items that characterize the three aspects of trade
secrets protection under UTSA:
• Substantive law:
– Whether a trade secret must be in continuous business use;
– Whether the owner must take reasonable efforts to protect the
secret;
– Whether mere acquisition of the secret is misappropriation;
• Civil procedure: The limitation on the time for the owner to take
legal action for misappropriation;
• Remedies:
– Whether an injunction is limited to eliminating the advantage
from misappropriation;
– The multiple of actual damages available in punitive damages.
5“Uniform Trade Secrets Act Prefatory Note”, Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 14.
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Table 11 shows the year of enactment of trade secrets statute in each state, the
index that Png (2014) develops to measure the strength of trade secrets protection
in each state prior to the enactment of statute and the improvement in trade secrets
protection given by the statute. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with each increment
of 1/6 representing one more item included in the trade secret protection. Details on
the construction of the index is in the Appendix. According to Png (2014), there are
39 states that adopted trade secrets statute from 1980 to 2000. The enactment of
trade secret statute is concentrated in the 1980s. Specifically, twelve states enacted
the statute from 1980 to 1985 and twenty one states enacted from 1986 to 1990. We
use this staggered enactment of trade secret statute as an exogenous shock to the
protection of trade secret and examine its impact on firms’ information asymmetry
and stock liquidity.
2.2.3 TRIPS
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was
negotiated at the end of Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in 1994. The purpose is to enforce a global standard of intellectual
property right protection among fellow WTO members in order to facilitate technol-
ogy transfer and technological innovation.6 The agreement requires member states to
implement laws that enforce patent protection for at least 20 years .
An important principle of the agreement is national treatment. According to the
agreement, “ Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment
no less favorable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection
of intellectual property”. With the implementation of TRIPS, patents granted in the
U.S. will receive patent protection in other WTO member countries. This ensures that
firms can have exclusive right to profit from their technology products in international




Though patent protection law was in place in the U.S. prior to TRIPS, the im-
plementation of TRIPS in the U.S. also strengthened patent protection domestically.
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) enacted on December 8th, 1994 en-
forces the twenty-year patent term in accordance with TRIPS. Prior to the enactment,
the patent term in the U.S. was seventeen years from the day the patent issued. After
the enactment, patents filed on or after June 8th, 1995 are granted for a term from
the issuance date to twenty years from the date of filing. 7 Therefore, patents granted
after the law change would receive an extended term as long as the patent processing
time is less than 3 years.
Therefore, the implementation of TRIPS in the U.S. and other WTO member
countries strengthen patent protection on two dimensions: One by increasing the
patent term and second by streamlining and providing more protection and enforce-
ment of patent rights internationally. With the stronger patent protection, patenting
firms that use patent will have lower cost of disclosing information on their innova-
tions and further improve stock liquidity by reducing information asymmetry. While
TRIPS is implemented gradually through the transition period, the enactment and
implementation of URAA in U.S. has more definite timing. We therefore define post
law change indicator based on the date when the twenty-year patent term is enforced
(June 8th, 1995).
We believe that these two events are exogenous to stock liquidity since the motiva-
tion of trade secrets statutes and TRIPS is not related to the stock market or equity
financing. Therefore, the two law changes regarding IP protection should provide




We extract patent data from NBER patent database. The NBER patent database
provides information on patents granted from 1962 to 2006.8 We use the assignee-
GVKEY link provided by the NBER database to match the patent data to firms’
accounting information and stock price information from Compustat and CRSP, re-
spectively. We also use analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S. We include common
stock (Share Code 10 or 11) traded in New York Stock Exchange, American Stock
Exchange, or Nasdaq (Exchange Code 1-3) and exclude firms with total assets less
than 5 million dollars.
2.3.1 Stock Liquidity
In this paper, our main variable of interest is stock liquidity. A stock is generally
considered liquid if it can be traded readily without impacting the stock price and/or
the trading cost is low. High stock liquidity has been shown to be related to lower
cost of equity (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002) as investors demand
lower return given the the lower trading cost. Therefore, stock liquidity is generally
a desirable feature for firms, especially those need to raise capital from the equity
market. While there is a large body of literature studying the determinants of stock
liquidity (see Easley and O’Hara, 2003), it generally reflects two types of costs. One is
the adverse selection cost due to information asymmetry among market participants
and the other is the transaction cost. An improvement in IP protection for patent or
trade secret has different implications to the information environment of the firm, thus
may have different impact to stock liquidity. Given the link between stock liquidity
and cost of equity capital, we focus on stock liquidity as the outcome variable in our
empirical analyses.
We use three measures of stock illiquidity. The first measure is Amihud’s (2002)
8A detailed description of these data can be found in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001)
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illiquidity ratio (Ln(Amihud)). It is defined as ln(AvgILLIQ×109), whereAvgILLIQ
is an yearly average of illiquidity, which is measured as the absolute return divided









where Daysi,t is the number of valid observation days for stock i in fiscal year t, and
Ri,t,d and DolV oli,t,d are the daily return and daily dollar trading volume, respectively,
for stock i on day d of fiscal year t. This measure reflects the average stock price
sensitivity to one dollar trading volume. Higher AvgILLIQ is interpreted as lower
stock liquidity.
The second measure is the yearly average of daily bid-ask spread:








where Daysi,t is the number of valid observation days for stock i in fiscal year t, and
Aski,t,d and Bidi,t,d are the closing ask and bid prices of stock i on day d of fiscal
year t. Higher Bid-Ask Spread is interpreted as lower stock liquidity. We do not use
this measure for the empirical analysis of trade secrets law due to the limited data
availability of bid/ask prices in the 1980s.
The third measure of illiquidity is the negative yearly average of daily trading









where V oli,t,d and Shrouti,t,d are the shares traded and number of shares outstanding
of firm i in day d of fiscal year t. Higher trading volume generally reflect higher stock
liquidity. To be consistent with the other two measures, we use the negative value of
turnover so that it measures the stock’s illiquidity instead of liquidity.
51
2.4 Empirical Design
We test the impact of trade secret statute on stock liquidity using the following model:
Stock Illiquidityi,t = α1 + β1TS Laws,t + γ
′
1CONTROLi,t−1 + φi + θt + εi,t. (5)
TS Law is the index representing the strength of trade secret protection for state
s in year t shown in Table 12. Firm fixed effects (φi) are year fixed effects (θt)
are also included in the model to control for factors invariant over time or across
firms in the same year. For stock illiquid we use two empirical proxies: Ln(Amihud)
and -Ln(Turnover). We control for a set of firm and industry characteristics lagged
by one year that has been shown in the literature to be related to stock liquidity,
including Ln(Assets), Leverage, Q, Profitability, Tangibility, Cash, Ln(Age), Return
Volatility, and Ln(Number of Analysts).9 We perform this test for public firms from
1980 to 2000 since most of the trade secret statutes are enacted in the 1980s and early
1990s. We do not use Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) in this test due to poor data availability
of bid and ask prices in the 1980s. The prediction is that β1 is significantly positive
if stronger trade secret protection reduces transparency of firms and thus increases
stock illiquidity. Panel A of Table 12 presents summary statistics for all the variables
used in the analyses of trade secret and stock liquidity.
To test the effect of TRIPS on stock liquidity, we estimate the following difference-
in-differences model:
Stock Illiquidityi,t = α1+β1Posti,t+β2Posti,t×Treatedi+γ′1CONTROLi,t−1+φi+εi,t.
(6)
When estimating this model around TRIPS, Posti,t is a binary variable that equal
to 1 if the observation is after the effective date when the twenty-year patent term is
enforced (June 8th, 1995) and 0 otherwise. Treatedi is the treated group indicator
that identifies firms affected by TRIPS. A firm is categorized as treated firm if it had
9All the variables are defined in the appendix.
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applied for patents from 1993 to 1994, the two-year period prior to the implementation
of TRIPS in the U.S.10 In addition, we control for the same set of control variables as
in Model 5 as well as firm fixed effects (φi) to control for all the time invariant firm
characteristics. Our prediction is that β2 should be significantly negative if patenting
firms reduce stock illiquidity significantly more than nonpatenting firms because of
the legislative change in patent protection.
We match every treated firm with one control firm that is not affected by the
change in patent law. We categorize a firm as a candidate control firm if it has not
applied for any patents from 1993 to 1994. We note that it is possible that firms
that did not use patent may pursue it after the new patent law motivated by the
strengthened patent protection. Also it is likely that firms never use patent may also
benefit from TRIPS through its strengthening protection of other forms of intellectual
property such as copyright and trademark. Nevertheless, these possibilities should
bias against finding significant difference between treated firms and control firms.
Firms are matched based on the characteristics mentioned above prior to the
effective date of TRIPS in the U.S. using propensity score matching with 0.005 caliper.
The probit model estimates used for computing propensity score are presented in
Table 23. Column 2 shows that after matching, most of the firm characteristics are
not significantly different between the treated group and control group. In Panel B
of Table 12, we present summary statistics for the treated group and the matched
control group in the 7-year period around the implementation of TRIPS in the U.S.
Most of the variables are very close between the two groups. The mean number of
patent grants for the control group is close but not equal to zero, implying that firms
that did not apply for patents within two years prior to TRIPS may have patents
granted some time during the seven year period. As we have discussed, having control
10We use a two-year period because the typical processing time of patent applications is about 2
years. So firms that applied for patents in 1993 or 1994 are likely to have patents granted after the
enforcement date of TRIPS.
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firms that may be affected by TRIPS should bias against our prediction.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Trade Secret Law
2.5.1.1 Trade Secret Statutes and Stock Liquidity
Columns 1 and 4 of Table 13 present the estimates of Model (5). The estimate of β1 is
positive for both Ln(Amihud) and -Ln(Turnover) as dependent variable, suggesting
that stock illiquidity is higher after the enactment of trade secret law in the firm’s
headquarter state. The estimate, however, is only significant for -Ln(Turnover).
Based on the coefficient estimate, an average increase in trade secret protection by
the enactment of statute (0.44 increase in the index) is related to 4.8% decrease in
both Ln(Amihud) and -Ln(Turnover).
The impact of trade secret law may vary across firms depending on their reliance
on trade secret to protect intellectual property. Small firms are generally more reliant
on trade secrets because it is costly to seek formal IP protection (Friedman, Landes,
and Posner, 1991; Lerner, 1995). Greater trade secret protection may induce small
firms to use more trade secret and thus cause their stock to be less liquid. To test
this hypothesis, we reestimate Model 5 and interact TS Law with indicator of firms
whose total assets or market share below the sample median. We present the results in
column 2, 3, 5, and 6 of Table 13, which show that the effect of trade secret statute on
stock liquidity is concentrated among small firms. The coefficient on the interaction
term is strongly significant for both firms with low total assets or firms with low
market share. The economic significance is also substantial. For example, for firms
with below-median total assets, an average increase in trade secret protection by the
enactment of statute is related to a 44.5% decrease in Ln(Amihud) and 10.3% decrease
in -Ln(Turnover). This test result is consistent with out prediction that small firms,
who potentially benefit more from stronger trade secret protection, increase stock
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liquidity more after the enactment of trade secret statute.
Lower stock liquidity is likely driven by higher adverse selection cost when firms
adopt more trade secret. To test whether information asymmetry increase around the
enactment of trade secret statute, we test a model similar to Model 5 but replace the
stock illiquidity measures with measures of analyst forecast quality as the dependent
variable. Specifically, we focus on analyst forecast dispersion and analyst forecast
error as measures of analyst forecast quality. Analyst dispersion is measured by
the standard deviation of analyst’s forecasts divided by analysts’ median forecast
and analysts’ forecast error is measured by the absolute difference between analysts’
median forecast and actual earnings divided by actual earnings. Both are measured
in percentage and we take natural logarithm of one plus these measures as dependent
variables in our regression. The results presented in Table 14 show that analysts’
forecast dispersion and error increase after the enactment of trade secret statute. An
average increase in trade secret protection by the enactment of statute is related to
7.7% (9.8%) increase in analysts’ forecast dispersion (error). However, the effect is
mostly similar between large firms and small firms, except for firms with low market
share that have marginally greater increase in analyst forecast dispersion. This result
is supportive of the hypothesis that information asymmetry increases after firms enjoy
stronger trade secret protection.
2.5.1.2 Trade Secret Protection and Patenting Activity
Png (2014) shows that technological firms increase R&D expenditure after the en-
actment of trade secret statute, suggesting that stronger trade secret protection en-
courages more investment in innovative activities. In the previous section we find
that small firms experience greater decrease in stock liquidity. The ground of our
prediction is that small firms are more likely to switch from patenting to secrecy after
the strengthening of trade secret protection. We therefore test whether small firms
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indeed reduce patenting after the enactment of trade secret statute. In Table 15, we
present the estimation of a model where the dependent variable is the log number
of patent applications and the independent variable of interest is TS Law and the
interaction with small firm indicators. The first column shows the estimates without
the interaction and the coefficient on TS Law is significantly negative at 10%, sug-
gesting that on average firms reduce patenting after the enactment of trade secret
law. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term presented in column 2 and 3
are significantly negative and greater in magnitude than the estimate in column 1.
This indicates that it is mainly small firms that reduce patenting after stronger trade
secret law. This is again consistent with our hypothesis that small firms rely more on
trade secret after the statute, causing greater opaqueness and lower stock liquidity.
2.5.1.3 Trade Secret Protection and Equity Financing
Stock liquidity is a important determinant of firm value (Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009).
One of the reason is because higher stock liquidity facilitates equity financing (Amihud
and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002; Easley and O’Hara, 2003, Butler, Grullon, and
Weston, 2005). Greater trade secrets protection may enhance the value of R&D
investment, causing firms to seek for more external capital. On the other hand,
lower liquidity due to greater use of secrecy may constrain firms’ equity financing.
We therefore examine firms’ equity financing activity after trade secret statute is
effective and the market reaction when firms raise equity capital.
We first estimate the following model to test how trade secret law changes the
likelihood of SEO:
Pr(SEO)i,t = α1 + β1Trade Secret Lawi,t + γ
′
1CONTROLi,t−1 + φi + θt + εi,t, (7)
where the dependent variable is the likelihood of firm i issuing an SEO in year
t. Similar to Model 5, we control for the same set of firm characteristics as well as
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firm and year fixed effects. This model is estimated using conditional logit regression.
Column 1 of Table 16 shows the estimates. The coefficient of β1 is not significant,
suggesting that firms on average are not more likely to issue SEO after trade secret
statute. To show how the effect differ for small firms, we add an interaction between
TS Law and indicators of small firms in column 2 and 3. The results show that firms
with lower total assets or market share are significantly more likely to issue SEO
after trade secret statute. This result indicates small firms do have higher demand
for equity capital, possibly due to the better investment opportunities given stronger
trade secret protection.
So far we find that small firms are more likely to raise equity capital despite lower
stock liquidity after the enactment of trade secret statute, the next question is how
the stock market reacts to SEOs after trade secret statutes. We test the following
model for all the SEO incidences:
SEO CAR = α1 + β1Trade Secret Lawi,t + γ
′
1CONTROLi,t−1 + λs + θt + εi,t, (8)
where SEO CAR is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the equal-weight
market return over various horizons. λs is the fixed effect for state s and θt is the
fixed effect for year t. In Table 17 we present estimates for CARs computed over four
different horizons. Except for the three-day CAR around SEO announcement, all the
other CARs over longer horizon are significantly lower for SEOs after trade secrets
statute. Based on estimates in column 4, an average increase in trade secrets protec-
tion after trade secrets statute is associated with 7.5% lower abnormal return over
one year. This finding is suggestive that stronger protection on secrecy likely induce
financing friction by increasing information asymmetry and lower stock liquidity.11
11Note that we do not find stronger effect of trade secret law on SEO CAR for small firms. This
is likely the outcome when firms make their optimal SEO decisions in equilibrium.
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2.5.2 TRIPS
2.5.2.1 TRIPS and Stock Liquidity
In this section, we focus on TRIPS as another natural experiment and examine the
implication of stronger patent protection on firms’ stock liquidity and financing. We
follow the similar structure as the analyses of trade secrets law by examining TRIPS
and stock liquidity first, followed by testing the heterogeneity of the effect TRIPS,
then studying the implication to equity financing.
The hypothesized mechanism is that stronger patent protection encourages greater
reliance on patenting to protect firms’ IP, making the firm more transparent and
increasing stock liquidity. Figure 5 shows that patenting activity indeed increases
after TRIPS. The average number of patent applications of the public firms increases
in the year U.S. enacted law complying with TRIPS. Since on average application-
grant lag is two years during that period (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001), the
number of patent grants increases sharply in the third year after TRIPS. Prior to 1998,
patent-related information becomes public when the patents are granted (Kogan,
Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman, 2012). Therefore, we expect the increase in stock
liquidity to take place as a bulk of patents are granted and focus on a seven-year
window around TRIPS in our empirical tests.
We start with testing the impact of TRIPS on stock liquidity. As mentioned in
Section 2.4, we estimate a difference-in-differences model specified in Equation (6).
We categorize a firm as a treated firm if it applied for patents in the two-year period
prior to the implementation of TRIPS and we match every treated firm with one
control firm.
Table 18 presents estimates of the diff-in-diff models around TRIPS. In columns
1, 3, and 5 we present estimates from year t-1 to year t+1 surrounding the imple-
mentation of TRIPS in the U.S., while in columns 2, 4, and 6 we present that from
year t-3 to year t+3. The results show that the coefficient for the interaction term is
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significantly negative at 1% level for all measures of stock illiquidity and all alterna-
tive time window. The effect is economically significant. For example, in a three-year
period surrounding the effective day of URAA, the bid-ask spread of treated firms
decreased by 9.6%, while that of the matched control group increased by 3.9% during
the same period. This is consistent with our prediction that patenting firms reduce
stock illiquidity significantly more than nonpatenting firm after the implementation
of TRIPS. While stock liquidity of patenting firms have a significant increasing trend
after TRIPS, the trend of the control group is not as clear. The estimate for the
post-TRIPS indicator is significantly negative for Ln(Amihud) and -Ln(Turnover)
but significantly positive for Ln(Bid-Ask Spread).
Figures 6 to 8 demonstrate the change in stock liquidity around TRIPS for the
patenting firms and control firms. All these figures show that there was no significant
difference in the trend of stock liquidity between two groups until when TRIPS was in
effect. Take Figure 7 for instance, after the patent law change, the bid-ask spread of
patenting firms decrease dramatically while that of the control firms remain roughly at
the same level in the following year. The patterns shown in the figures are consistent
with estimates in the diff-in-diff model that after the implementation of TRIPS, firms
that applied for patents increases stock liquidity significantly compared to firms that
did not apply for patents.
A key identifying assumption for all diff-in-diff models is “parallel trends”(Roberts
and Whited, 2010). It means that prior to the exogenous shock to patent rights pro-
tection, there should be no significant difference in the trend of stock liquidity between
treated firms and control firms. Otherwise, the difference in trends identified by the
model may be due to some preexisting factors rather than the new law that strength-
ens patent rights protection. Based on Figures 6 to 8, it appears that the trend of
stock liquidity of the two groups start to diverge only after the implementation of
TRIPS and this is consistent with the parallel trends assumption. As a robustness
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check, we formally test this assumption using placebo tests. We reestimate model (6)
by assuming that treatment takes place in 1992 or 1993. If parallel trends assumption
does not hold and stock liquidity of treated firms have been increasing more than con-
trol firms prior to the real treatment, β2 will still be significantly negative. However,
estimates reported in Table 24 in the Appendix show that β2 is not significant in any
specification of the placebo tests. This finding confirms our observation in the figures
and suggests that prior to the new patent law there no significant difference in the
trend of stock liquidity between treated firms and control firms. This supports our
notion that the improvement in stock liquidity for patenting firms over this period is
attributed to the strengthened patent rights protection.
Given more information released through patenting by patenting firms post-TRIPS,
information quality about future earnings may improve in the market. To show this
we use the diff-in-diff model to test the change in information quality about earnings
measured by the dispersion and error of analysts’ forecasts around TRIPS. Estimates
are reported in Table 19. Column 1 and 2 show that analyst dispersion decrease
significantly for patenting firms but not for control firms in both 3-year and 7-year
window. Similar results are found for analyst forecasts error as shown in column 3 and
4. Both the decrease in analyst dispersion and forecast error reflect lower information
asymmetry of patenting firms as they issue more earnings forecasts after TRIPS.
2.5.2.2 Who Are More Affected By TRIPS?
Next, we test several predicted heterogeneity of the effect of TRIPS on stock liquidity
in order to rule out the possible confounding events. First, the purpose of TRIPS is
protect the IP rights of firms involved in international trades. Therefore, industries
more reliant on export are more likely to benefit from the new law and we expect
firms in industries with larger fraction of sales from export or firms to have larger
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liquidity improvement after TRIPS. We test this prediction by estimating a difference-
in-differences model among patenting firms, interacting Post TRIPS with export
reliance of an industry. For each 4-digit SIC industry, we divide the total export
value prior to TRIPS by the total sales of all COMPUSTAT firms in that industry
in the same year.12 Since the denominator only represents sales by public firms but
not all the firms in this industry, the ratio of export to total sales may be greater
than one. In that case we winsorize the ratio at one. If industries with more export
benefit more from better IP rights protections, we expect the interaction term to be
significantly negative. We present the estimation results in Panel A of Table 20. The
interaction term is negative across all specifications and significant in three of the six
specifications, supporting our prediction that industries more reliant on foreign sales
benefit more from TRIPS.
Further, industries that do not have a reliable alternative to patent (e.g. trade se-
cret) may benefit more from the strengthening of patent right. For an industry, trade
secret may be a costly way to protect IP if dispute regarding trade secret takes place
frequently. In that sense, industries that have experienced a lot of trade secret litiga-
tions may find patents more valuable especially when the protection is strengthened
by TRIPS. We therefore estimate a difference-in-differences model among patenting
firms interact Post TRIPS with the rank of trade secret dispute frequency of an in-
dustry. Lerner (2006) collects historical records of California and Massachusetts state
cases in as well as federal cases on trade secret litigation and aggregate the number at
the level of 3-digit SIC industry. We rank the industries based on the number of cases
and interact it with the indicator of Post TRIPS in our regression.13 The results in
12The industry level export data is collected from the U.S. Census.
13The rank of industries in descending order of number of trade secret cases is: Computer Pro-
gramming (737), Miscellaneous Business Services (738), Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service (641),
Electronic Components and Accessories (367), Professional and Commercial Equipment (504), Ser-
vices to Dwellings and Other Buildings (734), Laundry, Cleaning and Garment Services (721), Eating
And Drinking Places (581), and other. We rank these industries from 8 to 1 and the rest of industries
are coded as 0. Please refer to Table 3 of Lerner (2006) for more detail.
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Panel B of Table 20 show that the interaction between Post TRIPS and Trade Secret
Dispute Rank is negative and significant at least 10% in four out of six specifications,
indicating firms in industries with more trade secret disputes experience greater in-
crease in stock liquidity. This is consistent with our prediction as industries with
more trade secret disputes may find patents more valuable when patent protection is
stronger. Both this and the results on export support that the increase in liquidity
is caused by TRIPS rather than other confounding events.
The marginal benefit from an improvement in patent protection may be different
across firms. Similar to the case of trade secret protection, large firms may gain
relatively little from a stronger patent protection because legal protection is not nec-
essary for them to compete against other firms. For example, even in the absence
of patent protection, IBM or Microsoft can compete against copycat firms with their
dominant market power. On the other hand, the marginal benefit of improved patent
protection could be much greater for small firms. Given the vulnerable position of
small firms in the competition, they are more likely to utilize patent rights to protect
themselves from IP infringement through litigation (Lanjouw and Schankermanm,
2004). Moreover, an extension in patent term grants small firms more time to exploit
their technology and this extra time could be critical to their survival in the business.
Small firms are also more subject to information asymmetry problem compared to
large firms. Therefore, small firms are more likely to benefit from the improvement
of patent protection compared with large firms. To test this, we perform a diff-in-diff
regressions among patenting firms where we interact Post TRIPS with an indicator
of small firms. Small Firm is either indicated by firms with total assets or market
share below the median prior to TRIPS.14 The estimates of the model presented in
Panel A of Table 21 show that the interaction term between Post TRIPS and Low
14Market share is defined as the fraction of sales the firm accounted for in the corresponding
4-digit SIC industry
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Ln(Assets) indicator is significantly positive at 1% level in all specifications. Similar
findings are shown for market share in Panel B. These results suggest that among
patenting firms, firms that are small in terms of assets or market share benefit more
from the strengthened patent rights protection and experience greater increase in
stock liquidity.
2.5.2.3 TRIPS and Equity Financing
With an increase in stock liquidity after strengthened patent rights, firms should
benefit by gaining easier access to equity financing. This is especially important for
small firms or financially constrained firms that may lack other sources of financing.
In this section we ask whether firms do take advantage of increased liquidity after
TRIPS by raising equity capital. To test this we again estimate a Diff-in-Diff model.
This time we use firm’s SEO activities as the dependent variable. We estimate the
following firm fixed effects logit model:
Pr(SEO)i,t = α4 +β7Posti,t +β8Posti,t×Treatedi +γ
′
4CONTROLi,t−1 +φi + εi,t. (9)
SEO is a binary variable that equal one if the firm issue an SEO in that year and zero
otherwise. Panel A of Table 22 shows the results. In columns 1 and 2 we estimate
the model in the full sample and estimate the different between patenting firms and
non-patenting firms. The estimates show that patenting firms on average are not
significantly more likely to raise equity capital following TRIPS. In columns 3 to 6,
we estimate the model among patenting firms and test the difference between large
firms and small firms or between constrained firms and unconstrained firms. The
estimates show that firms with smaller size, without paying dividends or access to
public debt, are significantly more likely to issue SEO after TRIPS.
In Panel B, we compare the market reaction to SEOs before and after TRIPS. We
do pooled OLS model regressing SEO CARs over different horizon on Post TRIPS
indicator with a set of firm controls. The estimates show that market reaction to SEOs
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is significantly better after TRIPS. This result is robust to CAR over various horizons.
SEOs after TRIPS are associated with 9.7% higher abnormal return over one year
post SEOs. This higher frequency of SEOs among small and financially constrained
firms after TRIPS and the better market performance suggest that TRIPS plays a
role in reducing financing friction by improving stock liquidity.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we find that different forms of IP protection have distinct implications
to firms’ equity financing. Stronger secrecy protection encourages firms to adopt
more secrecy, therefore increases information asymmetry and reduces stock liquidity.
By contrast, better patent protection causes firms to disclose more information by
patenting their inventions, resulting in higher stock liquidity. We find these results
by exploiting exogenous law changes, such as state trade secret statute and the im-
plementation of TRIPS, that improves the protection of either form of IP. Consistent
with the notion that higher stock liquidity is associated with lower cost in raising
equity capital, we find that SEOs after TRIPS (trade secret statute) are associated
with higher (lower) abnormal return in various horizons.
Our findings provide policy makers and academic researchers with a new perspec-
tive for the discussion and future development of IP protection law. In particular,
our findings show that IP protection plays a more important role in the financing
of small firms, who typically are in a more vulnerable position in product market
and encounter more frictions in raising capital. Therefore, our study has important
implication to policies that aim to facilitate growth of small innovative firms.
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Table 11: Trade Secrets Law in the US.
Column 1 presents the year in which states enacted a trade secrets statute. Column 2
shows an index compiled by Png (2014) measuring the strength of trade secrets protec-
tion under common law. Column 3 shows the increase in the protection after the enact-
ment of statute. The index characterizes three aspects of the law of trade secrets: sub-
stantive law, procedure, and remedies. Details of the index can be found in Png (2014)
State Year Common Law Statute
Alaska 1988 0 0.467
Arizona 1990 0.25 0.217
Arkansas 1981 0.5 0
California 1985 0.22 0.247
Colorado 1986 0 0.767
Connecticut 1983 0 0.467
Delaware 1982 0 0.467
District of Columbia 1989 0 0.467
Florida 1988 0.1 0.367
Georgia 1990 0 0.7
Hawaii 1989 0 0.467
Idaho 1981 0 0.467
Illinois 1988 0 0.7
Indiana 1982 0 0.467
Iowa 1990 0 0.467
Kansas 1981 0 0.467
Kentucky 1990 0 0.467
Louisiana 1981 0 0.4
Maine 1987 0 0.5
Maryland 1989 0.22 0.247
Michigan 1998 0.25 0
Minnesota 1980 0 0.467
Mississippi 1990 0 0.567
Missouri 1995 0 0.633
Montana 1985 0 0.567
Nebraska 1988 0 0
Nevada 1987 0 0.467
New Hampshire 1990 0.025 0.442
New Mexico 1989 0 0.467
North Dakota 1983 0 0.467
Ohio 1994 0.25 0.283
Oklahoma 1986 0.025 0.442
Oregon 1988 0 0.467
Rhode Island 1986 0 0.467
South Dakota 1988 0 0.467
Utah 1989 0 0.467
Vermont 1996 0 0.567
Virginia 1986 0.025 0.442
Washington 1982 0 0.467
West Virginia 1986 0 0.467
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Table 12: Summary Statistics For Chapter 2.
Panel A presents summary statistics of the main variables used in our analyses of trade
secret statute. Panel B compares the summary statistics of the treated group and con-
trol group used in the analyses of TRIPS. We use propensity score matching for which
the estimation is presented in the Appendix. We winsorize all firm and loan charac-
teristics at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All the variables are defined in the Appendix.
Panel A
N Mean Median S.D.
Ln(Amihud) 45,844 5.399 5.511 2.967
-Ln(Share Turnover) 45,861 5.944 5.937 1.021
Ln(Assets) 46,147 4.750 4.517 1.948
Leverage 46,147 0.240 0.213 0.206
Q 46,147 1.913 1.325 1.657
Profitability 46,147 -0.006 0.042 0.265
Cash 46,147 0.152 0.066 0.196
Tangibility 46,147 0.318 0.260 0.239
Ln(Age) 46,147 2.171 2.272 1.001
Return Volatility 46,147 0.036 0.032 0.021
Ln(Number of Analysts) 46,147 1.217 1.099 1.068
Market Share 46,147 0.030 0.015 12.957
Ln(Analyst Dispersion) 27,188 2.218 1.993 1.160
Ln(Analyst Error) 31,794 3.135 2.960 1.508
Ln(Patent Applications) 46,147 0.495 0.000 1.049
SEO Dummy 46,147 0.063 0.000 0.243
Panel B
Control Group Treated Group
N Mean Median S.D. N Mean Median S.D.
Ln(Amihud) 4,744 4.941 4.800 2.847 6,341 4.418 4.218 2.707
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 4,679 -3.529 -3.546 0.851 6,227 -3.665 -3.673 0.813
-Ln(Turnover) 4,744 5.884 5.900 0.998 6,341 5.729 5.714 0.966
Ln(Assets) 4,744 5.227 5.006 2.029 6,343 5.265 5.013 1.990
Leverage 4,744 0.205 0.162 0.201 6,343 0.194 0.162 0.182
Q 4,744 1.924 1.340 1.774 6,343 2.118 1.583 1.644
Profitability 4,744 0.009 0.040 0.263 6,343 -0.016 0.048 0.304
Cash 4,744 0.154 0.066 0.196 6,343 0.178 0.080 0.221
Tangibility 4,744 0.280 0.195 0.249 6,343 0.274 0.244 0.172
Ln(Age) 4,744 2.208 2.342 1.169 6,343 2.297 2.500 1.237
Return Volatility 4,744 0.035 0.030 0.022 6,343 0.034 0.030 0.019
Ln(Number of Analysts) 4,744 1.402 1.386 1.050 6,343 1.472 1.609 1.017
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Table 13: Trade Secret Law and Stock Liquidity of Small Firms
In this table, we show that the impact of trade secret statute on stock liquidity is con-
centrated among small firms. The dependent variables are measures of stock illiquidity
including Ln(Amihud) and -Ln(Turnover) and the independent variables of interest are TS
Law and its interaction with indicators of small firms. The following lagged firm charac-
teristics are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage, Q, Profitability, Cash,
Tangibility, Ln(Age), Return Volatility, and Ln(Number of Analysts). Firm and year fixed
effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors are in
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variables Ln(Amihud) -Ln(Turnover)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TS Law 0.109 -0.431*** -0.125 0.109*** 0.032 0.085*
(1.52) (-4.79) (-1.56) (2.76) (0.74) (1.86)
TS Law × Low Ln(Assets) 1.442*** 0.202***
(11.24) (3.07)
TS Law × Low Market Share 0.637*** 0.065
(5.67) (1.05)
Low Ln(Assets) 0.061 -0.021
(0.88) (-0.62)
Low Market Share -0.291*** -0.018
(-4.75) (-0.54)
Ln(Assets) -0.892*** -0.889*** -0.089*** -0.087***
(-36.70) (-35.66) (-6.60) (-6.36)
Leverage 1.168*** 0.653*** 1.176*** 0.055 0.004 0.056
(14.74) (7.86) (14.82) (1.22) (0.09) (1.25)
Q -0.443*** -0.388*** -0.442*** -0.086*** -0.080*** -0.086***
(-42.63) (-36.77) (-42.39) (-19.41) (-18.43) (-19.36)
Profitability -0.743*** -0.874*** -0.746*** -0.241*** -0.254*** -0.241***
(-14.04) (-15.38) (-14.09) (-9.57) (-10.06) (-9.56)
Cash -0.337*** -0.326*** -0.338*** -0.076 -0.076 -0.078
(-3.79) (-3.39) (-3.82) (-1.57) (-1.57) (-1.60)
Tangibility 0.237** 0.433*** 0.236** 0.142** 0.160** 0.141**
(1.97) (3.20) (1.97) (2.25) (2.53) (2.25)
Ln(Age) 0.168*** 0.034 0.155*** 0.058*** 0.042** 0.056***
(5.22) (0.91) (4.83) (3.30) (2.36) (3.20)
Return Volatility 17.771*** 22.003*** 17.633*** -2.377*** -1.974*** -2.392***
(23.70) (29.36) (23.55) (-5.43) (-4.60) (-5.47)
Ln(Number of Analysts) -0.311*** -0.595*** -0.312*** -0.127*** -0.156*** -0.127***
(-15.61) (-28.42) (-15.68) (-11.54) (-15.25) (-11.54)
Adjusted R2 0.896 0.885 0.896 0.746 0.745 0.746
Observations 45,844 45,844 45,844 45,861 45,861 45,861
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 14: Trade Secret Law and Analyst Forecast
In this table, we show that stock opacity in terms of analyst forecast dispersion and fore-
cast error increases after the enactment of trade secret statute. The dependent variables
are Ln(Analyst Dispersion) and Ln(Analyst Error) and the independent variables of interest
are TS Law and its interaction with indicators of small firms. The following lagged firm
characteristics are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage, Q, Profitability,
Cash, Tangibility, Ln(Age), Return Volatility, and Ln(Number of Analysts). Firm and year
fixed effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors are
in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variables Ln(Analyst Dispersion) Ln(Analyst Error)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TS Law 0.176** 0.192*** 0.120 0.222** 0.274*** 0.160*
(2.53) (2.64) (1.59) (2.53) (2.96) (1.66)
TS Law × Low Ln(Assets) -0.096 -0.234
(-0.70) (-1.48)
TS Law × Low Market Share 0.236* 0.234
(1.85) (1.57)
Low Ln(Assets) -0.011 -0.016
(-0.16) (-0.21)
Low Market Share -0.054 -0.078
(-0.80) (-0.99)
Ln(Assets) 0.094*** 0.098*** 0.104*** 0.107***
(3.84) (4.01) (3.51) (3.56)
Leverage 0.690*** 0.743*** 0.694*** 0.671*** 0.717*** 0.675***
(7.28) (8.00) (7.33) (6.45) (6.99) (6.49)
Q -0.084*** -0.087*** -0.083*** -0.071*** -0.075*** -0.070***
(-9.29) (-9.71) (-9.24) (-7.02) (-7.60) (-6.97)
Profitability -0.874*** -0.871*** -0.873*** -0.332*** -0.326*** -0.331***
(-11.82) (-11.85) (-11.80) (-5.96) (-5.90) (-5.94)
Cash -0.125 -0.126 -0.128 -0.412*** -0.410*** -0.414***
(-1.20) (-1.21) (-1.23) (-3.52) (-3.52) (-3.54)
Tangibility 0.701*** 0.647*** 0.701*** 0.347** 0.300* 0.347**
(4.71) (4.36) (4.73) (2.04) (1.79) (2.05)
Ln(Age) 0.095*** 0.112*** 0.093*** 0.026 0.037 0.023
(3.02) (3.56) (2.94) (0.68) (0.95) (0.60)
Return Volatility 10.237*** 9.794*** 10.189*** 1.511 1.119 1.461
(8.86) (8.54) (8.83) (1.43) (1.07) (1.39)
Ln(Number of Analysts) 0.207*** 0.237*** 0.208*** 0.144*** 0.173*** 0.144***
(10.69) (12.96) (10.71) (6.30) (8.07) (6.29)
Adjusted R2 0.531 0.531 0.532 0.370 0.370 0.370
Observations 27,188 27,188 27,188 31,794 31,794 31,794
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
68
Table 15: Trade Secret Law and Patenting Activities
In this table, we show that small firms tend to reduce patenting after the enactment of
trade secret statute. The dependent variable is Ln(Patent Applications) and the independent
variables of interest are the interaction between TS Law and the binary variable indicat-
ing firms Ln(Assets) or Market Share below the sample median. The following lagged firm
characteristics are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage, Q, Profitability,
Cash, Tangibility, Ln(Age), Return Volatility, and Ln(Number of Analysts). Firm and year
fixed effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors are
in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variable: Ln(Patent Applications)
(1) (2) (3)
TS Law -0.069* -0.029 -0.034
(-1.90) (-0.60) (-0.74)
TS Law × Low Ln(Assets) -0.113**
(-2.36)








Leverage -0.145*** -0.043 -0.146***
(-4.10) (-1.36) (-4.13)
Q 0.027*** 0.017*** 0.027***
(5.71) (3.61) (5.67)
Profitability -0.029 -0.005 -0.028
(-1.40) (-0.27) (-1.35)
Cash 0.025 0.020 0.023
(0.63) (0.50) (0.57)
Tangibility 0.082* 0.043 0.082*
(1.80) (0.95) (1.80)
Ln(Age) 0.051*** 0.074*** 0.053***
(3.06) (4.02) (3.18)
Return Volatility -0.216 -1.102*** -0.196
(-0.93) (-4.97) (-0.85)
Ln(Number of Analysts) -0.006 0.049*** -0.006
(-0.65) (5.24) (-0.62)
Adjusted R2 0.845 0.841 0.845
Observations 46,147 46,147 46,147
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
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Table 16: Trade Secret Law and Seasoned Equity Offerings
In this table, we show that small firms are more likely to issue SEO after the enactment of trade
secret statute. We estimate a conditional logit model where the dependent variable is Ln(Patent
Applications) and the independent variables of interest are the interaction between TS Law and
the binary variable indicating firms Ln(Assets) or Market Share below the sample median. The
following lagged firm characteristics are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage,
Q, Profitability, Cash, Tangibility, Ln(Age), Return Volatility, and Ln(Number of Analysts). Firm
and year fixed effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors
are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variable: SEO Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
TS Law 0.085 -0.226 -0.128
(0.40) (-0.96) (-0.53)
TS Law × Low Ln(Assets) 1.042***
(3.19)








Leverage 2.240*** 2.035*** 2.251***
(9.00) (8.58) (9.07)
Q 0.315*** 0.346*** 0.316***
(13.10) (14.82) (13.16)
Profitability 0.527*** 0.425*** 0.526***
(3.55) (3.05) (3.54)
Cash -1.447*** -1.484*** -1.473***
(-4.94) (-5.18) (-5.01)
Tangibility -0.492 -0.363 -0.507
(-1.32) (-1.02) (-1.37)
Ln(Age) -0.110 -0.197** -0.122
(-1.32) (-2.47) (-1.46)
Return Volatility -11.259*** -9.813*** -11.442***
(-4.35) (-3.88) (-4.42)
Ln(Number of Analysts) -0.203*** -0.316*** -0.203***
(-3.73) (-6.30) (-3.72)
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.145 0.148
Observations 17,661 17,661 17,661
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
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Table 17: Trade Secret Law and Market Reaction to SEOs
In this table, we show that the stock market reacts more positively to SEOs after trade
secret statute. The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal return over different hori-
zons around SEOs and the independent variables of interest is TS Law . The following
lagged firm characteristics are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage, Q,
Profitability, Cash, Tangibility, Ln(Age), Return Volatility, and Ln(Number of Analysts).
State and year fixed effects are also included. t-statistics using robust standard errors are
in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variables CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+10) CAR(0,+60) CAR(0,+250)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TS Law 0.002 -0.039** -0.056* -0.171**
(0.24) (-2.42) (-1.65) (-2.37)
Ln(Assets) 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004
(0.58) (-0.31) (-1.14) (-0.44)
Leverage 0.002 0.008 -0.004 -0.136**
(0.20) (0.63) (-0.13) (-2.00)
Q -0.002 -0.004* -0.004 -0.009
(-1.57) (-1.73) (-0.87) (-0.89)
Profitability 0.011* 0.014 0.064*** 0.119**
(1.91) (1.57) (3.11) (2.24)
cash 0.016 0.026 -0.004 -0.010
(1.61) (1.52) (-0.13) (-0.13)
Tangibility 0.012** 0.003 -0.023 0.038
(2.19) (0.32) (-1.03) (0.84)
Ln(Age) 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.006
(1.09) (1.06) (-0.30) (-0.47)
Return Volatility -0.060 0.329 -0.054 0.342
(-0.42) (1.29) (-0.10) (0.31)
Ln(Number of Analyst) -0.004** -0.004 0.010 0.013
(-2.51) (-1.25) (1.40) (0.88)
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.018 0.029 0.038
Observations 2,424 2,424 2,426 2,426
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 18: Change in Stock Liquidity Around TRIPS.
In this table, we present Diff-in-Diffs estimates where the dependent variable are measures of stock
illiquidity including Ln(Amihud), Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) and -Ln(Turnover) and the independent
variables of interest is the interaction term between Post TRIPS and Treated. The following lagged
firm characteristics are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage, Q, Profitability, Cash,
Tangibility, Ln(Age), Return Volatility, and Ln(Number of Analysts). Firm fixed effects are also
included. Column 1, 3, 5 present estimates in the 3-year window while column 2, 4, 6 present esti-
mates in the 7-year window around the law change. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard
errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Ln(Amihud) Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) -Ln(Turnover)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post TRIPS -0.223*** -0.264*** 0.008 0.043** -0.118*** -0.166***
(-4.94) (-6.62) (0.38) (2.16) (-4.19) (-6.73)
Post TRIPS × Treated -0.174*** -0.185*** -0.059** -0.088*** -0.072** -0.052*
(-3.04) (-3.70) (-2.33) (-3.51) (-2.12) (-1.75)
Ln(Assets) -0.796*** -0.841*** -0.163*** -0.261*** -0.051 -0.083***
(-9.96) (-19.53) (-5.37) (-14.31) (-1.06) (-3.46)
Leverage 0.512 0.916*** 0.166 0.323*** -0.259 -0.105
(1.62) (6.00) (1.42) (4.49) (-1.52) (-1.21)
Q -0.337*** -0.353*** -0.080*** -0.087*** -0.072*** -0.086***
(-11.06) (-20.14) (-8.38) (-14.28) (-6.41) (-11.91)
Profitability -0.327** -0.454*** -0.072 -0.125*** -0.123** -0.172***
(-2.44) (-5.62) (-1.56) (-4.38) (-2.26) (-4.31)
Cash -0.030 -0.302* -0.002 -0.048 0.222 0.005
(-0.11) (-1.84) (-0.02) (-0.71) (1.43) (0.05)
Tangibility 1.026** 0.665*** 0.200 -0.029 0.386 0.333**
(2.36) (2.80) (1.36) (-0.28) (1.59) (2.51)
Ln(Age) -0.274*** -0.078** -0.114*** -0.104*** -0.078** 0.056***
(-3.98) (-2.32) (-4.77) (-6.55) (-2.13) (2.84)
Return Volatility 1.095 12.415*** 0.235 4.827*** -0.566 -2.417***
(0.42) (8.09) (0.26) (8.15) (-0.38) (-2.83)
Ln(Number of Analysts) 0.011 -0.192*** 0.033 0.014 0.033 -0.077***
(0.17) (-5.72) (1.29) (0.84) (0.90) (-3.98)
Adjusted R2 0.934 0.920 0.865 0.813 0.836 0.789
Observations 5,241 11,085 5,236 10,906 5,241 11,085
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Years 3 7 3 7 3 7
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Table 19: Change in the Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Error Around TRIPS.
In this table, we present estimates from Diff-in-Diffs models where the dependent variable are
Ln(Analyst Dispersion) and Ln(Analyst Error) and the independent variables of interest is the
interaction term between Post TRIPS and Treated. The following lagged firm characteristics are
also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage, Q, Profitability, Cash, Tangibility, Ln(Age),
Return Volatility, and Ln(Number of Analysts). Firm fixed effects are also included. Column 1,
and 3 present estimates in the 3-year window while column 2, and 4 present estimates in the 7-year
window around the change of patent law. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors
are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Ln(Analyst Dispersion) Ln(Analyst Error)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post TRIPS 0.053 -0.011 0.152* 0.075
(0.94) (-0.24) (1.79) (1.32)
Post TRIPS × Treated -0.223*** -0.219*** -0.096 -0.217***
(-3.29) (-4.08) (-0.93) (-3.09)
Ln(Assets) 0.260** 0.065 0.270* 0.136**
(2.37) (1.34) (1.84) (2.26)
Leverage 0.010 0.315* -0.102 0.251
(0.02) (1.73) (-0.25) (1.13)
Q -0.052** -0.077*** 0.011 -0.009
(-2.07) (-4.78) (0.41) (-0.53)
Profitability -0.334* -0.451*** 0.166 -0.054
(-1.87) (-4.41) (1.04) (-0.66)
Cash -0.775** -0.559*** -0.322 -0.774***
(-2.13) (-2.68) (-0.77) (-3.37)
Tangibility 0.815 0.718** 1.311* 0.578*
(1.39) (2.48) (1.77) (1.76)
Ln(Age) 0.039 0.036 -0.127 -0.039
(0.42) (0.96) (-1.17) (-0.84)
Return Volatility 1.327 7.634*** -8.192* 0.273
(0.31) (3.08) (-1.90) (0.13)
Ln(Number of Analysts) 0.152 0.252*** 0.264** 0.302***
(1.62) (5.93) (2.13) (5.59)
Adjusted R2 0.595 0.559 0.456 0.421
Observations 3,559 7,537 4,084 8,606
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Years 3 7 3 7
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Table 20: Foreign Sales, Trade Secret Disputes, and Change in Stock Liquidity Around TRIPS.
In this table, we present estimates from Diff-in-Diffs models among treated firms where the
dependent variable are measures of stock illiquidity including Ln(Amihud), Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) and
-Ln(Turnover) and the independent variables of interest is the interaction term between Post and
Export (Panel A) or Trade Secret Disputes Rank (Panel B). The following lagged firm character-
istics are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage, Q, Profitability, Cash, Tangibility,
Ln(Age), Return Volatility, and Ln(Number of Analysts). Firm fixed effects are also included.
Column 1, 3, 5 present estimates in the 3-year window while column 2, 4, 6 present estimates in the 7-
year window around the implementation of TRIPS. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard
errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Foreign Sales
Ln(Amihud) Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) -Ln(Turnover)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post -0.356*** -0.336*** -0.069** -0.039 -0.181*** -0.173***
(-4.87) (-5.40) (-2.30) (-1.31) (-4.58) (-5.33)
Post × Exportpre -0.245 -0.432*** -0.040 -0.088 -0.233** -0.159*
(-1.38) (-2.98) (-0.56) (-1.25) (-2.15) (-1.84)
Adjusted R2 0.923 0.908 0.868 0.818 0.848 0.797
Observations 2,143 4,749 2,141 4,678 2,143 4,749
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Years 3 7 3 7 3 7
Panel B: Trade Secret Dispute
Ln(Amihud) Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) -Ln(Turnover)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post TRIPS -0.370*** -0.417*** -0.053*** -0.030* -0.195*** -0.207***
(-9.57) (-12.27) (-3.07) (-1.75) (-8.87) (-11.61)
Post TRIPS -0.023 -0.024 -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.019* -0.020**
× Trade Secret Dispute Rank (-1.14) (-1.32) (-3.62) (-3.89) (-1.87) (-2.32)
Adjusted R2 0.935 0.921 0.877 0.823 0.854 0.811
Observations 3,547 7,877 3,542 7,740 3,547 7,877
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Years 3 7 3 7 3 7
74
Table 21: Firm Size and Change in Stock Liquidity Around TRIPS.
In this table, we show that small firms and financially constrained firms experienced greater increase
in stock liquidity after TRIPS. We present estimates from Diff-in-Diffs models among treated firms
where the dependent variable are measures of stock illiquidity including Ln(Amihud), Ln(Bid-Ask
Spread) and -Ln(Turnover). In Panel A and B, and the independent variables of interest is the in-
teraction term between Post TRIPS and empirical proxies for small firms including Low Ln(Assets)
and Low Market Share, both measured in 1994. The following lagged firm characteristics are also
included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), Leverage, Q, Profitability, Cash, Tangibility, Ln(Age),
Return Volatility, and Ln(Number of Analysts). Firm fixed effects are also included. Column 1,
3, 5 present estimates in the 3-year window while column 2, 4, 6 present estimates in the 7-year
window around the implementation of TRIPS. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard
errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Firm Size Measured by Ln(Assets)
Ln(Amihud) Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) -Ln(Turnover)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post TRIPS -0.178*** -0.227*** -0.017 0.024 -0.128*** -0.176***
(-5.12) (-6.75) (-0.86) (1.19) (-5.93) (-9.56)
Post TRIPS × Low Ln(Assets)pre -0.458*** -0.462*** -0.110*** -0.155*** -0.173*** -0.095***
(-6.36) (-7.35) (-3.40) (-4.96) (-4.26) (-2.81)
Adjusted R2 0.937 0.923 0.877 0.825 0.856 0.812
Observations 3,547 7,793 3,542 7,656 3,547 7,793
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Years 3 7 3 7 3 7
Panel B: Market Share at 4-digit SIC Level
Ln(Amihud) Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) -Ln(Turnover)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post TRIPS -0.223*** -0.289*** -0.012 0.033 -0.154*** -0.184***
(-5.56) (-7.62) (-0.55) (1.57) (-6.21) (-9.23)
Post TRIPS × Low Market Sharepre -0.351*** -0.317*** -0.120*** -0.175*** -0.113*** -0.074**
(-4.83) (-4.95) (-3.73) (-5.57) (-2.82) (-2.18)
Adjusted R2 0.936 0.922 0.878 0.825 0.855 0.811
Observations 3,532 7,758 3,527 7,621 3,532 7,758
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Panel B, we show that the stock market reacts more positively to SEOs after TRIPS. The sample
consists of SEOs in the seven-year period around TRIPS. The dependent variables are cumulative
abnormal return over different horizons around SEOs and the independent variables of interest
is Post TRIPS. The following lagged firm characteristics are also included in the regressions:
Ln(Assets), Leverage, Q, Profitability, Cash, Tangibility, Ln(Age), Return Volatility, and Ln(Number
of Analysts). State and year fixed effects are also included. t-statistics using robust standard errors
are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel B: Market Reaction to SEOs
Dependent Variables CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+10) CAR(0,+60) CAR(0,+250)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post TRIPS 0.006** 0.011** 0.045*** 0.097***
(2.34) (2.30) (4.53) (4.59)
Ln(Assets) 0.000 0.000 0.010** 0.016
(0.34) (0.03) (2.18) (1.63)
Leverage 0.010 0.006 -0.009 -0.094
(1.23) (0.42) (-0.30) (-1.55)
Q 0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.003
(0.13) (-0.42) (1.22) (0.40)
Profitability 0.003 0.009 0.062*** 0.070
(0.54) (1.01) (3.30) (1.52)
cash 0.001 -0.010 -0.010 -0.048
(0.13) (-0.63) (-0.33) (-0.65)
Tangibility 0.010* -0.016 -0.009 0.032
(1.66) (-1.60) (-0.43) (0.74)
Ln(Age) 0.002 0.002 -0.007 -0.013
(1.14) (0.66) (-1.43) (-1.15)
Return Volatility -0.110 0.569** 0.479 0.897
(-0.68) (2.05) (1.02) (0.90)
Ln(Number of Analysts) -0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.003
(-1.58) (0.80) (0.07) (-0.20)
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.005 0.019 0.011
Observations 2,055 2,055 2,057 2,057
Number of Years 7 7 7 7
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Table 23: Propensity Score Matching Regressions and Summary Statistics.
This table presents probit regressions used for propensity score matching in the year prior to TRIPS.
The dependent variable equals to 1 if the firm has applied for patents in 1993 or 1994 (treatment
group) and 0 otherwise (control group). Column 1 presents estimates in the entire sample in the
year before TRIPS including 1,178 treatment firms and 3,293 control firms. Column 2 presents

















Return Volatility -2.271* -3.423*
(-1.73) (-1.72)
Ln(Number of Analysts) 0.169*** 0.001
(4.99) (0.02)
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.005
Observations 4,471 1,819
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Table 24: Placebo Test: Diff-in-Diff Regressions around 1992 and 1993
This table presents estimates from the Diff-in-Diff regressions using annual data in the 3-year
window around 1992 or 1993 to test the parallel trends in stock liquidity prior to the implementation
of TRIPS. In column 1 to 3 (4 to 6), we use 1993 (1992) as the event year and match treatment
firms with control firms in the preceding year. Post equals to 1 if the observation is in or after
year 1993 (1992). The following lagged firm characteristics are also included in the regressions:
Ln(Assets), Leverage, Q, Profitability, Cash, Tangibility, Ln(Age), Return Volatility, and Ln(Number
of Analysts). Firm fixed effects are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard
errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
1992-1994 1991-1993
Ln(Amihud) Ln(Spread) -Ln(Turnover) Ln(Amihud) Ln(Spread) -Ln(Turnover)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post -0.185*** -0.010 -0.075*** -0.131* -0.010 -0.044
(-3.81) (-0.49) (-2.76) (-1.85) (-0.30) (-1.37)
Post × Innovative -0.035 -0.029 0.049 -0.108 -0.011 -0.019
(-0.57) (-1.13) (1.41) (-1.40) (-0.28) (-0.49)
Ln(Assets) -0.567*** -0.114*** 0.009 -0.514*** 0.005 0.099
(-5.86) (-3.54) (0.21) (-4.69) (0.10) (1.64)
Leverage 0.966*** 0.268* -0.084 0.767** 0.197 -0.152
(2.59) (1.76) (-0.42) (2.12) (1.06) (-0.82)
Q -0.244*** -0.047*** -0.054*** -0.263*** -0.056*** -0.058***
(-6.74) (-4.97) (-3.92) (-7.01) (-4.55) (-3.75)
Profitability -0.166* -0.058* -0.049 -0.435 -0.138 -0.088
(-1.65) (-1.76) (-0.97) (-1.40) (-1.00) (-0.90)
Cash -0.354 -0.249 0.012 -0.707* -0.213 -0.106
(-1.26) (-1.64) (0.08) (-1.75) (-1.41) (-0.54)
Tangibility 0.378 0.055 0.242 1.132* 0.241 0.275
(0.70) (0.29) (0.97) (1.89) (0.98) (0.87)
Ln(Age) 0.070 0.018 0.083** -0.122 -0.092** 0.025
(0.85) (0.55) (2.53) (-1.23) (-2.53) (0.58)
Return Volatility 4.325* -0.082 -2.367 5.741** -0.688 -2.182
(1.69) (-0.08) (-1.60) (2.10) (-0.70) (-1.51)
Ln(Number of Analysts) 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.113 0.080** 0.043
(0.37) (0.86) (0.61) (1.33) (2.15) (1.05)
Adjusted R2 0.945 0.916 0.852 0.934 0.918 0.833
Observations 4,378 4,205 4,378 3,979 3,096 3,979
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Figure 3: Average Patent Grants for Firms in the Semiconductor and Chemical Industry 1980-2005
Figure 4: Average Ln(Amihud) for Firms in the Semiconductor and Chemical Industry 1980-2005
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Figure 5: Patent Applications and Patent Grants Around TRIPS
Figure 6: Ln(Amihud) Around TRIPS
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Figure 7: Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) Around TRIPS
Figure 8: Ln(Share Turnover) Around TRIPS
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CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF COVENANT VIOLATIONS ON
CORPORATE INVESTMENT IN R&D
3.1 Introduction
The economics literature points to technological innovation as a primary source for
productivity gains and economic growth (Solow, 1957). As underscored by models
of endogenous growth, advances in technology and the knowledge base of the econ-
omy stem from the decision of various economic players to make sizable and ongoing
investments in R&D (e.g., Romer 1990). About two-thirds of the overall R&D expen-
ditures in the U.S. are made by corporations – as they seek to develop new products
and gain a competitive edge.1 These R&D expenses contribute greatly to the do-
mestic economy: as Baumol (2001) notes, much of the U.S. economic growth can be
attributed to significant innovations by established corporations.
Given the vital role innovative firms play, it is important to understand better
their access to financing and, in particular, the extent to which their R&D activities
can be impeded by capital market frictions. Our focus in the paper is on the impact
of debt covenant violations by innovative firms.2 The concern is that there could be
substantial value destruction in the event that financial covenants are violated given
the relative absence of tangible assets in these firms. A covenant violation causes
1The R&D/GDP ratio of United State was 2.89% as of 2012 http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/
infbrief/nsf14307/. Commensurately, corporate investment in R&D has a shown a tremendous
growth in the last few decades and accounts for approximately 63% of the $428.2 bn in R&D per-
formed in the U.S. in 2011. According to Business R&D and Innovation Survey (BRDIS), which
was developed and cosponsored by the National Science Foundation and Census Bureau, “companies
spent $294 billion on research and development performed in the United States during 2011, com-
pared with $279 billion during 2010”. http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf14307/.
2Banks are a significant source of investment capital for both R&D-intensive and non-R&D-
intensive firms (see Houston and James 1996 and Johnson 1997).
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control rights to pass to the lender and increases their bargaining power relative to
the borrowers. Creditors can use the threat of accelerating the loan to intervene in the
firm policies. In the paper, we analyze how covenant violations and the consequent
transfer of control rights to lenders impact the R&D expenditures of the firms and
their innovative output (patents, citations to patents) after the covenant violations.
The key question we address in the paper is whether banks tend to utilize their control
rights judiciously to affect improvements in the functioning of R&D intensive firms —
or whether they have a short-term orientation and slash R&D expenses, irrespective
of their longer-term potential.
A large literature highlights how financial contracts have the ability to mitigate
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Smith and Warner (1979)) and facil-
itate financing with the pledging of state-contingent control rights (e.g., Aghion and
Bolton (1992); Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)). Covenants are ubiquitous in private
loan contracts and violations are not uncommon. These covenant violations, though
considered as technical defaults, convey the same contractual rights to creditors as
payment defaults and give lenders strong bargaining power allowing them to materi-
ally influence violating firm’s investment and financial policies (Chava and Roberts
(2008); Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009, 2012)). In the paper, our objective is to better
understand how R&D expenditures are affected by the covenant violations and the
consequent transfer of control rights to the lender. To our knowledge, we are the
first to study lender intervention in firms’ R&D policies after a technical covenant
violation.
We examine the effect of violations of net worth, tangible net worth or current ratio
loan covenants for a comprehensive sample of U.S. borrowers in the LPC Dealscan
database. Violations are determined based on when a firm’s financial values or ratios
fall below the corresponding thresholds imposed by the loan covenants. Focusing
on covenant violations also allows us to employ a regression discontinuity design or
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RDD (see Chava and Roberts (2008) for a detailed discussion of the institutional
features of the covenant violations that make it suitable for a regression discontinuity
design.) The application of RDD in this context is appropriate because the treatment
(covenant violation) is assigned based on whether the accounting variable falls below
the corresponding threshold. Firm-quarters just above and below the threshold are
similar except that the latter violate a covenant. Estimates based on the full sample
show that R&D expenses are significantly reduced over four and eight quarters after
covenant violations. R&D reduces by 1.6% over four quarters and 2.7% over eight
quarters after covenant violations. These results are in line with the findings in
the literature (see Chava and Roberts, 2008, and Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2012) for
corporate investment.
We also examine a discontinuity sample where we exploit this quasi-random as-
signment of treatment within a narrow band around the threshold, and can identify
the local treatment effect of covenant violation on firm policies. In choosing the band-
width for RDD we rely, in part, on the Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2012) method.
The effect of covenant violations on R&D investment remains statistically significant
after imposing a narrow range. The estimated coefficients suggest that covenant vio-
lations are associated with a 2% decrease in R&D in four quarters and a 3.7% decrease
in eight quarters. This effect is also robust to controlling for firm characteristics. Un-
derstandably, the results are stronger for the subsample where R&D is nonzero in the
quarter of the covenant violation: a 5% decrease in R&D over four quarters and a
9.3% decrease over eight quarters.
To further show the causal link between creditors’ control right and change in R&D
investment, we investigate the effect a state level exogenous legislative shocks, the pas-
sage of anti-recharacterization statues. These statues strengthen creditor rights over
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collateral (Mann 2014) and hence would tend to moderate the incentive of banks to in-
tervene in firms’ decisions. 3 The anti-recharacterization statutes help creditors avoid
the automatic stay by allowing them to transfer collateral to a bankruptcy-remote
special-purpose entity. Our results suggest that while R&D decreases significantly af-
ter covenant violations, it changes less after the enactment of anti-recharacterization
laws that strengthen creditors’ right over collateral. This is consistent with creditors
becoming less aggressive in intervening in firm’s long term investment decisions when
they are better protected by state laws.
We have so far shown a causal link between covenant violations and a subsequent
decrease in R&D at the violating firm. But its not evident whether the decrease
in R&D expenses following covenant violation is in the interests of the firm. It is
possible that banks may be more concerned about short term cash flow generation
and are unable to discern whether the R&D investment, a long-term investment with
uncertain payout, is value enhancing or not. On the other hand, it is possible that
creditors identify inefficient investment by the borrowing firm and use their control
rights to help improve firm’s investment performance. We distinguish between these
two hypotheses by examining the circumstances in which creditors cut R&D expenses
and what the consequences of their actions are.
We use two proxies for R&D investment efficiency of the firm: Return on Assets
(ROA) and a innovative efficiency (see Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2012; Almeida, Hsu
and Li, 2013) as measured by the output (patents) generated by the input (R&D
investment). We find that the R&D decrease is concentrated among borrows in which
the innovative efficiency is relatively lower and is statistically and economically larger
than that found among borrowers where the R&D investment efficiency is higher.
Also, in general, among the borrowers with high R&D efficiency, the decline in R&D
3The United States imposes an automatic stay requirement that requires the judge’s approval for
a secured creditor to claim the collateral.
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consequent to the covenant violations is indistinguishable from zero.
We next examine whether the cuts in R&D affect shareholders’ value by compro-
mising their long term interest. If lenders are judicious in using their control rights,
then lenders’ action should result in better investment performance. Previous stud-
ies by Nini et al. (2012) show that covenant violations are associated with positive
subsequent stock market reaction, suggesting that lenders’ action adds value to the
shareholders. One potential channel is that lenders help improve the efficiency of
firm’s R&D investment. Supportive of the notion that the R&D expenses are cut ju-
diciously, both in the full sample and in the discontinuity sample, covenant violations
are not associated with a significant change in innovation output. This result, com-
bined with the previous results on the change in R&D, suggests that when borrowers
violate a loan covenant and the control rights pass to the lenders, lenders reduce firms’
R&D investment without affecting their future innovation output and thus improve
the efficiency of the firms’ R&D investment.
Our paper contributes to various strands of the literature. First, to our knowledge,
our paper is the first to document that lenders consider innovative activity of firms
ex post in exercising their control rights after covenant violations.4 We contribute to
the literature on the transfer of control rights after technical covenant violations by
showing an additional channel, R&D, through which creditors intervene in borrowers’
investment policies. Importantly, our results showcase that when innovative borrowers
violate their covenants and control rights pass to lenders, these lenders appear to
exercise control rights judiciously and differentiate between firms that are performing
valuable innovative activity and those that are not. Consequently, there is no drop in
innovative output, as measured by patents and citations to patents, after the covenant
violations.
4e.g. Sweeney (1994), Dichev and Skinner (2002), Chava and Roberts (2008), Nini, Smith, and
Sufi (2009, 2012), Liang and Falato (2014), etc.
87
Second, we contribute to the literature on the financing of innovation.5 Rajan and
Zingales (2003) argue that equity and public debt are more conducive to innovative
activity, while bank financing may be better suited to funding more routine projects.
However, public markets have their own problems in financing innovative activity.
For instance, Holmstrom (1989) argues that public securities may also pressure man-
agement to focus on short-term routine projects at the expense of longer-term novel
projects. Similarly, the results of Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) are consistent
with the view that, because of capital market imperfections, the flow of internal fi-
nance is the principal determinant of the rate at which small, high-tech firms acquire
technology through R&D. In light of this literature, our results suggest that, at least
in some contexts, banks may well be adept at valuing the innovative activity of the
firms and efficient at providing capital. Bank lending is an important source of fund-
ing for public firms and the fact that lenders exercise their control rights judiciously
over R&D policies and don’t inefficiently shut down projects means that even firms
without deep pockets may be able to pursue R&D.
Our paper is also related to the literature that examines the effects of laws,
regulations, and governance on innovation. Acharya and Subramanian (2009) find
that debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws foster innovation and economic growth, while
Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2012) provide evidence that laws that impose
restrictions on dismissal of employees encourage innovation and entrepreneurship.
Atanassov (2013) highlights the potential for agency problems, showing that the pas-
sage of anti-takeover laws shields management from external governance and leads to
less innovation. In a somewhat different setting, Seru (2012) finds that firms that are
more reliant on internal capital markets produce fewer and less novel patents because
5e.g. Kortum and Lerner (2000), Atanassov, Nanda, and Seru (2007), Benfratelloa, Schiantarellic,
and Sembenelli (2008), Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009), Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg
(2011), Tian and Wang (2014), Nanda and Nicholas (2012), Amore, Schneider, and Zaldokas (2013),
Chava, Oettl, Subramanian, and Subramanian, (2013), etc.
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of agency problems between headquarters and divisional managers. Chava, Oettl,
Subramanian, and Subramanian (2013) show that intrastate banking deregulation
induced more innovation by young, private firms.
Our paper is also related to a concurrent working paper by Gu, Mao, and Tian
(2014) who study the impact of covenant violations on the patent output of the bor-
rowers. They find that there is a significant decrease in patent output after covenant
violations. Our results are markedly different from the results documented in their
paper that firms’ innovation output decreases after covenant violations. But we find
that the innovative output as measured by the patents and citations to patents doesn’t
decrease because banks curtail R&D when the innovative efficiency of the R&D in-
vestment is lower. As we point out in detail later in Section 3.4.2, controlling for
firm level characteristics, especially firm size is important in this analysis and Gu,
Mao and Tian (2014) do not include any firm controls in their specifications. We also
highlight several conceptual and methodological reasons for the differences in findings
between our paper and Gu, Mao, and Tian (2014). We note that this issue is not
just about using R&D or patenting as a measure of the firm level innovation. R&D
is partly one of the inputs to the innovation process that drives patenting and we
show that banks do in fact curtail excessive R&D. Admittedly, R&D information is
missing for a significant fraction of the firms in the COMPUSTAT data (partly due
to firms not reporting the expense when it is insignificant). But simply using patent
measures of innovation doesn’t address this issue because the firms that patent are
mostly a subset of firms that report R&D expenses in COMPUSTAT.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and the
construction of our measures of firm innovation and lender experience along with the
description of the bank loan data. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 presents the methodology and
the main empirical results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Data and Construction of Variables
In this section, we describe the main sources of data used in the paper and detail
the construction of the key variables used in the analysis. In particular, there are
three main sources of data that we use to construct our sample: (1) Loan Pricing
Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan for the bank loan data, (2) COMPUSTAT data for
firm level accounting information, and (3) The Harvard Patent Network Dataverse
for the innovation measures.
We use the dollar-denominated private loans to U.S. firms from the LPC DealScan
database. This database provides comprehensive information on private loan pricing
and contract terms such as loan amount and maturity, loan purpose, and financial
covenants, etc., from 1987 onwards. The information is collected from SEC filings and
public documents, lenders, and a staff of reporters. DealScan provides good coverage
of loan contracts made to U.S. public firms. According to Carey and Hrycray (1999),
the database covers between 50% and 75% of the volume for all commercial and
industrial loans in the U.S. The loan data is organized by deal (package) and loan
(facility). A package is a contract that may contain multiple loan facilities. Following
Chava and Roberts (2008), we focus on deals originated from 1994 onwards when
studying covenant violations because information on covenants is limited before 1994.
We collect quarterly accounting information of U.S. public firms from merged
CRSP-COMPUSTAT database, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). We
then match firm accounting data with DealScan data using Michael Roberts’ DealScan-
COMPUSTAT Linking Database (See Chava and Roberts, 2008, for details). For each
firm-quarter, we find all the packages that are effective and have covenants imposing a
minimum level of net worth, tangible net worth, or current ratio. The reason we focus
on these three covenants, as discussed by Chava and Roberts (2008), is that these
covenants are more frequently used in loan contracts and can be measured without
ambiguity. For each firm-quarter, we find the tightest covenant with respect to these
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three accounting variables from all the effective loans.
In some cases, covenants are dynamic as the threshold is designed to change over
time. We follow Chava and Roberts (2008) in dealing with these issues. For dynamic
covenants on current ratio that have a starting threshold and an ending threshold, we
linearly interpolate the covenant threshold over the life time of the loan. For net worth
covenants that adjust with net income, we adjust the covenant threshold based on the
end of quarter income and the required fraction of the income for adjustment. For
other net worth covenants that require a stock issuance adjustment (a.k.a. “buildup”)
we exclude them from the sample because DealScan does not provide information on
what fraction of stock issuance the threshold should adjust. More details about the
data cleaning process are provided in the Appendix B of Chava and Roberts (2008).
After merging, we have 28,843 firm-quarter observations for 2,137 firms that are
bounded by at least one of the three financial covenants from 1994 to 2011.
The patent data is from the Harvard Patent Network Dataverse.6 The Harvard
Patent Network Dataverse provides information on patents granted from 1975 to 2010
and all the citations made to these patents over the same period (Lai et al., 2013).
We merge the patent data with the CRSP-COMPUSTAT using the patent-PERMNO
link provided by Noah Stoffman.7
The other commonly used data source for the patent data is the NBER patent
data. The NBER database provide patent information from 1975 to 2006. The
Harvard database update the patent information up to 2010. With the updated
version of patent data, we are able to cover a longer period in the empirical analysis.
Dass, Nanda, and Xiao (2014) show that the number of patent applications in the
patent database is subject to truncation bias towards the end of the sample period




reason, the number of patent applications in the NBER version drops sharply from
2001 to 2006. Using the updated version from Harvard database significantly reduces
truncation bias in the number of patent applications in that period. However, the new
data is still subject to the same bias for years close to 2010. Other than adjusting the
bias following Seru (2014), we ensure the robustness our findings by by dropping the
last four years of observations for empirical tests that involve patent data following
Dass, Nanda, and Xiao (2014).8
A covenant violation takes place when the value of net worth, tangible net worth,
or current ratio is below the corresponding threshold imposed by the relevant loan
covenant. We define default distance as the difference between these three accounting
variables and the corresponding default boundaries. Since our sample is a union set
of observations with the three financial covenants, we replace the missing value of
distance with respect to one covenant with zero if the observation is bounded by the
other covenants. When testing the impact of covenant violations on changes in firm’s
R&D policy, we control for the first and second power of default distance with respect
to these three financial covenants.
We control for firm characteristics that are likely to correlate with covenant vi-
olations and firm’s R&D policies: ROA is operating income divided by total assets;
Market-to-Book is the market value of equity plus total liability minus deferred taxes
and investment tax credit, divided by total assets; Ln(Assets) is measured by the
natural logarithm of total assets. Firms are more likely to invest in R&D if there
is higher operating performance, high market-to-book, and have larger firm size. In
addition, we control for the beginning level of R&D, scaled by total assets. We do
this in order to control for the mechanical relation between and beginning level and
the subsequent change in R&D.
8Results are unreported for brevity and are available upon request.
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We measure a firm’s innovation output based on the log number of patent appli-
cations filed in a quarter and the average number of citations on these patents. The
number of patent applications, however, is subject to truncation bias because the
Harvard Patent Network Dataverse only reports patent grants up to 2010. Patents
that have been filed but not yet granted as of 2010 are thus not in the sample. The
number of citations is also subject to truncation bias as older patents tend to accumu-
late more citations compared with newer patents. To adjust for this truncation bias,
we follow Seru (2014) and divide the number of patents (citations) for each firm-year
by the mean number of patents (citations) or the same patent technology class and
year. repetitive
Table 25 presents summary statistics for all the variables in the covenant violation
analysis. A detailed description of all the variables is provided in the Appendix. We
winsorize all the variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The fraction of firm-quarters
that violate any of the three covenants is 14.1%, which is close to that reported by
Chava and Roberts (2008). The statistics of firm characteristics including the three
covenant variables are also largely consistent with the literature. The sample mean
of Ln(Assets) is 5.701, corresponding to 300 million dollars of average total assets.
The average R&D expenditure is 1.47 million dollars.
The number of observations for citations and innovative efficiency measures (based
on citations and patents) is much smaller than the full sample because these statistics
can only be computed for a subset of firms in the sample: there are 4,937 firm-
quarter observations that have both non-zero value of R&D as well as number of
patents. Among these observations, the innovation efficiency in terms of adjusted
number of patents per million dollars of R&D stock has an average of 0.11 with
the standard deviation of 0.23, while the similarly measured efficiency based on the
adjusted number of citations has an average of 0.28 with the standard deviation of
0.60.
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3.3 Empirical Results: R&D Investment Around Covenant
Violations
In this section, we investigate lender’s actions on firms’ R&D policy when firms violate
covenants and the control rights pass to lenders. As noted, we focus on financial
covenants that impose a minimum level of net worth, tangible net worth, and current
ratio. A firm is identified as violating a covenant if the value of any of these three
accounting variables in the quarter end is below the closest threshold imposed by the
outstanding loans. We then test the following model:
∆Ln(R&D)t,t+n = α1 + β1Violation + γ1′Control + γ2′DD + φj + ψt + θT + ε, (10)
where ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+n is the log change in the R&D expenditure n quarters after
violation. We take one plus R&D expenditure to avoid losing observations from
taking a natural logarithm of zero. Violation is a binary variable that equal 1 if
one of the three financial covenants is binding. Control refers to control variables
including R&D/Assets, ROA, Market-to-Book, and Ln(Assets). DD refers the linear
and squared default distance with respect to the three covenants. We also include
calendar quarter dummies (ψt), fiscal quarter dummies (θT ), and Fama-French 48
industry dummies (φj) to control for unobserved effects that are invariant within
time and industry. We cluster standard errors by firm and quarter following Petersen
(2009). This empirical specification resembles the one used by Nini, Smith, and Sufi
(2012). By taking a first difference in the dependent variable, we control for firm
effects that are invariant over time. Moreover, this specification tests the cumulative
effect of covenant violation on R&D policy from the violation quarter over different
horizons. Here we focus on the change in R&D over one quarter, one year, and two
years from violations.
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3.3.1 Full Sample Analysis
Table 26 reports the estimates in the entire sample. We analyze the impact of covenant
violations on the log change in the R&D expenditure 1, 4 and 8 quarters after violation
in models 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The first column shows the effect of violations on
the change in R&D in a quarter after violations is statistically insignificant, suggesting
that the impact of creditor control rights over R&D policy does not turn up in the
first quarter. This is slightly different from the findings from Chava and Roberts
(2008) findings on capital expenditure (CAPEX) as they show that CAPEX decreases
immediately after covenant violations. However, this difference is not surprising to
the extent that R&D is more stable over time compared with CAPEX and thus
may not be adjusted immediately (Hall and Lerner, 2009). Investment in R&D is
also very different from investment in capital expenditure. R&D expenditure is not
only composed of capital and material costs but also labor. As Hall and Lerner
(2009) highlight, in practice majority of R&D expenditure is the wages and salaries of
scientists and engineers. The efforts of the scientists and engineers create an intangible
asset, the firms’ knowledge base, where the profits will be generated. To the extent
that this knowledge is embedded in the human capital of the firms’ employees, firms
will lose the intangible assets if the employees leave or are fired. Hall and Lerner
(2009) argue that firms tend to smoothen their R&D expenditure in order to avoid
laying off knowledge workers. So, R&D expenditure tend to behave as if it has high
adjustment costs and the dynamics can differ from investment in physical assets.
In line with these arguments in Hall and Lerner (2009), estimates in Columns
2 and 3, however, show that the R&D is significantly reduced over four and eight
quarters after covenant violations. R&D reduces by 1.6% over four quarters and 2.7%
over eight quarters after covenant violations and the effect is statistically significant
at least 5% level. The greater magnitude of the coefficient estimate for the eight-
quarter change than that for the four-quarter change suggests that cuts in R&D due
95
to covenant violations span beyond one year.
3.3.2 Regression Discontinuity Design
The results in the entire sample are nevertheless subject to endogeneity issues. For
example, both covenant violations and decreases in R&D investments may be jointly
driven by deteriorating performance. To address the endogeneity concerns, we employ
the regression discontinuity design (RDD) to identify the effect of covenant violations
on firm’s R&D policy following Chava and Roberts (2008). RDD can be applied in
this context because treatment (covenant violation in this case) is assigned based on
whether the accounting variable falls below the covenant threshold. Firm-quarters
that are just above the threshold are comparable to those just below the threshold
except that the latter violate a covenant. By exploiting this quasi-random assignment
of treatment within a narrow band around the threshold, we can identify the local
treatment effect of covenant violation on firm policies.
Chava and Roberts (2008) present a detail discussion on why RDD is an appro-
priate identification strategy for this question. One potential concern with the RDD
design in the context of covenant violations is that the distance from the covenant
threshold is not exogenous. It is certainly possible that managers can take action
such as manipulating the accounting ratios underlying the covenant thresholds to
avoid covenant violations. But relationship lending is a repeated game with the bor-
rowers relying on the relationship lenders over time for various types of loans and
services. It is less likely that borrowers can hope to consistently manipulate the
accounting ratios without the informed relationship lenders catching up to the ma-
nipulation. Moreover, many of the accounting measures underlying the covenants
that we consider are non-GAAP.
In line with these arguments, Chava and Roberts (2008) find that proxies of
earnings management such as discretionary accrual are not significantly related to
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the likelihood of covenant violations. According to the survey by Graham, Harvey,
and Rajgopal (2005), managers tend to cut investment rather than manipulate the
financial reports in order to avoid covenant violations. Such behavior by managers
should bias against finding a significant effect of observed covenant violations on
subsequent cut in R&D investment. So, as noted by Chava and Roberts (2008), RDD
is an appropriate design in the context of covenant violations.
To implement RDD we focus on firm-quarters that fall within a narrow band
around the covenant threshold. To determine the bandwidth for RDD, we first use
Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2009) method to estimate the asymptotically optimal
bandwidth that minimizes MSE. The estimated bandwidth, in terms of the relative
distance between the accounting variable and the corresponding covenant threshold,
range from 23% to 52% for the three financial covenants.9 This is larger than the
estimation by Chava and Roberts (2008) who make use of the Silverman’s (1986)
method. As Imbens et al. (2009) recommend, their estimated bandwidth can be
taken as a reference point to assess the sensitivity of estimates to bandwidth choices.
Therefore we estimate Model (10) using both 50% bandwidth based on our estimation
and 20% bandwidth used by Chava and Roberts (2008). For the local regressions in
the discontinuity sample, we do not control for default distances as we do in the entire
sample since we already focus on a narrow range of default distances.
We start by graphically present the change in R&D expenditure within a nar-
row window around the covenant threshold. In Figure 9 we plot the log change in
R&D expenditure over different horizon against distance to default measured by the
minimum relative distance to the three financial covenant thresholds within the 50%
bandwidth. Figure 9a shows that there is a discontinuity in the change of R&D over
a quarter around the covenant threshold. There also appear to be a structural shift
9We winsorize the default distance at the 5th and 95th percentiles to avoid outliers from driving
the bandwidth estimation.
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in the one-quarter change of R&D on the two sides of the cutoff. The difference
though is somewhat marginal, which is consistent we our earlier analysis and discus-
sion that R&D tend to be smoothen over time and cannot be adjusted immediately.
Figure 9b and 9c, however, show a clearer discontinuity in the longer term change
of R&D around covenant threshold. The confidence interval of the fitted line shows
that the estimated R&D change is significantly lower for firm-quarters right below the
covenant threshold compared with those close to but above the threshold. The dis-
crete effect of covenant violation presented in the figure is even sharper for the change
in R&D over eight quarters. This is consistent with our the full sample results that
covenant violation is associated with a significant decrease in R&D investment which
lasts beyond a year.
Table 27 show the results in the discontinuity sample. In Panel A we present
estimations in the subsample of firm-quarters within ±50% around the covenant
thresholds. Around 40% of observations are removed by imposing this condition.
The estimation shows that the effect of covenant violations on R&D change remains
statistically significant after imposing a narrow range. The estimated coefficient in
Columns 1 and 2 suggest that covenant violations are associated with a 2% decrease in
R&D in four quarters and a 3.7% decrease in eight quarters. This effect is also robust
to the inclusion of firm characteristics. As shown in Columns 3 and 4, the estimated
coefficient on Violation remains significant at 5% level when firm characteristics are
included.
Panel B shows estimates in the ±20% band following Chava et al. (2008). This
window leaves us with around 7,400 observations. This sample size is larger than
Chava et al. because first, we use a longer time series (1994-2011); Second, we do
not remove firms that never experience a covenant violation over the sample period.
The effect again remains significant within this range and the economic magnitude
remain similar to the previous estimations. Since a 20% bandwidth leaves us with a
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reasonable sample size and statistical power, we will use the 20% bandwidth for the
subsequent RDD analysis.
In Panel C we raise the bar further and restrict the observations to be within
±10% around the covenant thresholds. After imposing this condition there are around
3,600 observations. The result again shows that covenant violations have a significant
negative impact on the change of R&D over the next eight quarters. Moreover, the
estimated treat effect is not sensitive to different bandwidth choices. For example,
in Column 2 the estimated coefficient for Violation varies from -0.0378 to -0.0345
across the three bandwidth choices. These tests together show the robustness of our
finding and establish the causal effect of covenant violations on the subsequent R&D
investments.
3.3.3 Robustness Check
The sample that we have considered so far includes firms with significant R&D activ-
ities and firms without R&D expenses. In another test, we analyze the subsample of
firms with some R&D activities in the violation quarters. Other than confirming the
robustness of our finding, it also makes sense to focus on R&D firms since creditor
intervention in R&D is relevant only when there are some R&D activities to start
with. Table 28 present the estimation of Model (10) in the subsample where R&D
is nonzero in quarter t. The sample size is reduced substantially, but the effect of
covenant violations remain significant. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect be-
comes stronger – a covenant violation is associated with a 5% decrease in R&D in
four quarters and a 9.3% decrease in eight quarters. In the discontinuity sample, the
coefficient for Violation is significant at 1% level in Column (3) and the coefficient
estimate suggests that among firms that are closely lying around the covenant thresh-
old, a violation of covenant will cause a 11% decrease in R&D over eight quarters after
violations. Given that a firm cannot cut R&D when has not been any R&D to begin
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with, these results provide a better estimate of the extent to which lenders intervene
in firms’ R&D activities after covenant violations.
So far, our empirical specification closely followed Chava and Roberts (2008). One
advantage of this approach is that we know which specific covenant was violated and
what the distance from the covenant threshold is over time. This also allows us to
use the regression discontinuity design that helps in identifying a casual relationship
between covenant violations and subsequent R&D investments. On shortcoming of
this approach is the limited sample size as we need to rely on the dealscan database
for the precise threshold that triggers the covenant violations. An alternate approach
that increases the sample size is to consider covenant violations based on the SEC
filings.
Finally, we replicate this result using alternative data. Nini, Smith, and Sufi
(2012) use records of covenant violations of all non-financial public firms from 1996
to 2007 from the SEC 10-Q and 10-K filings and show that creditors take various
actions that improve firm value when a covenant is violated. The data is available
on their website.10 The advantage of the this data is that it covers a broader group
of firms, including those without covenant information covered in DealScan. It also
covers violation of covenants other than the three financial covenants we focus on
using the DealScan data. The disadvantage, however, is that we cannot accurately
measure the distance to default in each case because the covenant violations parsed
from SEC filings are not specific to any loan or covenant. For the same reason, we are
not able to exploit the regression discontinuity design in this setting. Nevertheless, if
creditors use the control rights to reduce R&D investment as we predict, we should




Hence, we reestimate Model (10) in the sample covered by Nini et al. (2012).11
Since this SEC filing-based violation data is not specific to any loan or covenant, we
can not measure the default distance with respect to any specific covenant. Instead,
we control for the level of Net Worth Ratio and Current Ratio in additional to the
firm characteristics we include in the previous analyses. The regression estimates are
presented in Table 29. It shows that violations identified in the SEC filings also has a
significant negative effect on R&D investment. This further supports the notion that
lenders intervene in the R&D investment of violating firms when they takeover the
control rights.
3.3.4 Creditor Rights Over Collateral And Action over R&D Investment
To further shows the causal link between creditors’ control right and change in R&D
investment, we explore creditors’ incentive to influence borrower’s investment policy.
In the event of a technical default, banks monitor and influence borrowers’ investment
to ensure that creditors’ interests are protected. Therefore, an exogenous change in
creditor rights may shift their incentive to intervene in firms’ decisions.
To test this prediction, we exploit an exogenous legislative shock that strengthens
creditor rights over collateral. The United States imposes an automatic stay require-
ment that requires the judge’s approval for a secured creditor to claim the collateral.
The anti-recharacterization statutes help creditors avoid the automatic stay by allow-
ing them to transfer collateral to a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose entity. Mann
(2014) explores these anti-recharacterization statutes combined with exogenous court
decisions that strengthen the role of state property law for patents to show that
stronger creditors’ rights over patent collateral facilitate the financing of innovation.
We follow Mann (2014) and use the staggered enactment of anti-recharacterization
11We follow Nini et al. (2012) in filtering the data.
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statues in various states to examine the impact on stronger creditor rights over col-
lateral on creditors’ action when borrowers violate a loan covenant. We estimate the
following model:
∆Ln(R&D)t,t+n = α2 + β2Violation + β3Violation× Post ARL + β4Post ARL
+ γ3′Control + γ4′DD + φj + ψt + θT + ε, (11)
where Post ARL is a binary variable that equal 1 after the enactment of anti-
recharacterization laws (AR) in the state the firm is located or incorporated.12 The
variable of interest in this model is the interaction term between Violation and Post
ARL. The hypothesis is that if post-violation change in R&D is caused by creditors’
intervention to protect their own interest, then with a stronger rights over collateral
creditors may be less aggressive in influencing borrowers’ investment decision, thus
reducing the impact of covenant violation on subsequent R&D change.
We present the estimates of Model (11) in Table 30. The results show that while
β2 remains significantly negative, the estimate of β3 is significantly positive in both
the entire sample (Panel A) and discontinuity sample (Panel B) except in one spec-
ification. Moreover, the magnitude of β3 is close to that of β2 across specifications.
These estimates suggest that while R&D decreases significantly after covenant viola-
tions, such decrease is mitigated after the enactment of anti-recharacterization laws
that strengthen creditors’ right over collateral. This is consistent with our prediction
that creditors will be less aggressive in intervening in firm’s long term investment
decisions when they are better protected by state laws.
3.4 Does Creditor Intervention Enhance Innovative Per-
formance?
So far we have shown that a covenant violation has a causal impact on firm’s fu-
ture R&D investment with R&D investment decreasing up to 8 quarters after the
12Table 4 in Mann (2014) provides the states and enactment year of anti-recharacterization laws.
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covenant violations. Given the importance of R&D investment to the U.S. economy13
and the fact that banks are a significant source of capital for investment for both R&D
intensive firms and non R&D intensive firms (see Houston and James 1996 and John-
son 1997), it is important to understand the situations in which R&D investments
decreases after the covenant violations.
There are two competing hypotheses that can potentially explain this finding.
First, it could be that lenders are more concerned about the short term performance
and therefore push for better short term performance at the cost of long term invest-
ment. Under this hypothesis, lenders’ action could undermine the long term interest
of shareholders. An alternative explanation is that creditors identify inefficient in-
vestment by the borrowing firm and use their control rights to help improve firm’s
investment performance. To distinguish between these two hypotheses, we exam-
ine under what circumstances creditor intervene in R&D investment and what the
outcomes of their actions are.
We first check whether the effect of covenant violations vary with firms’ operating
performance. We again estimate Model (10) with control on firm characteristics in
the entire sample and discontinuity sample. This time we allow the coefficient on
Violation to vary across subsamples with high/low ROA prior to violation quarter.
The results in Table 31 show that the coefficient on Violation is significant only when
ROA prior to violation quarter is below the sample median. This result holds both
in the full sample and discontinuity sample, suggesting that creditors take action on
firm’s R&D investment only when firms experience low operating performance prior
to violations.
13One can gauge the importance of R&D to the economy by looking at the rationale for the R&D
tax credit is enacted in 1981 and subsequently renewed regularly.
103
3.4.1 R&D Efficiency and Creditors’ Action over R&D Investment
Next we examine the hypothesis that lenders force a cut R&D because they identify
inefficient investment when borrowers are violation of a covenant. We measure the
efficiency of R&D investment following the literature (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2012;
Almeida, Hsu and Li, 2013):
Innovative Efficiencyt = Innovation Outputt/(R&Dt−1 + 0.8× R&Dt−2 + 0.6× R&Dt−3
+ 0.4× R&Dt−4 + 0.2× R&Dt−5), (12)
where Innovation Outputt is measured by either the adjusted number of patents ap-
plied in year t or the adjusted number of citations for patents applied in year t.
As mentioned in the Section 3.2, the number of patents and citations are adjusted
for truncation bias in the patent data. The denominator is the depreciated sum of
R&D expenditure from year t − 1 to year t − 5, reflecting the innovation input in
the past five years. This ratio measures the amount of innovation output per unit of
input and therefore captures the efficiency of a firm’s innovative investment. A high
value of this measure reflects that R&D investments have been efficient in generating
more patents or patents with greater impact. Therefore, we use this measure to judge
whether violating firms have been making R&D investments efficiently compared with
other firms. We estimate Model (10) and allow the coefficient of Violation to vary
with the level Innovative Efficiency in the year prior to a covenant violation. Since
this efficiency measure is relevant only when firms have non-zero R&D expenditure
and choose patent their innovation, here we focus on firms that have non-missing
value both in the numerator and denominator. This leaves us with around 4,900
observations.
We present the results in Table 32. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A show that the
coefficient of Violation is significant only in the Low Efficiency subsample measured
by patent-R&D ratio, suggesting that lenders tend to curb R&D investment when
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previous investment has not been efficient in generating patents. In Columns 3 and 4,
there is not a significant difference between subsamples with above- and below-median
level of citation-based efficiency. A possible explanation is that lenders only focus on
the quantity of innovation output in gauging the efficiency of firms’ R&D investment.
In Panel B, when we focus on the discontinuity sample, most of the coefficients are
not significant, possibly due to the lack of statistical power (the sample size is below
1,000). The only exception is in Column 2, where the change in R&D in eight quarters
is significant among low efficient subsample. Overall, the results show that creditors
tend to cut R&D more when the number of patents applied is low relative to its input
prior to a covenant violation.
These results are reassuring for a number of reasons. In general, the financing of
R&D investments is complicated by the fact the investments are risky and long-term
in nature. Unlike capital expenditures, the output is mostly in intangible assets,
specialized to the firm that performs the R&D (see Hall and Lerner 2009). Since
lenders mostly prefer to lend against tangible collateral and cash flow, this has led to
the view that debt – particularly bank debt – might be unsuitable for the financing
of R&D intensive firm (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 2003). A central concern about debt
financing of R&D-intensive firms is the potential for considerable value destruction
in the event that control passes to the lender. Our results show that lenders are
judicious in exercising their control rights and use their enhanced bargaining power
to force firms to cut inefficient R&D investment. These results are also in line with the
results documented in Chava and Roberts (2008) where the investment cut following
covenant violations is concentrated in firms with agency and information problems.
3.4.2 The Effect of Covenant Violations on Innovation Output
Previous tests suggest that lenders differ in their action on the borrowing firm’s R&D
policy depending on the firm’s performance in terms of ROA or Innovative Efficiency.
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These results seem to support the idea that lenders intervene in the R&D investment
policy to improve the efficiency of their investment. Another way to test this hy-
pothesis is to look at the outcome of creditor intervention. If lenders are judicious
in using their control rights, then lenders’ action should result in better investment
performance. Previous studies by Nini et al. (2012) show that covenant violations are
associated with positive subsequent stock market reaction, suggesting that lenders’
action adds value to the shareholders. One potential channel is that lenders help
improve the efficiency of firm’s R&D investment. To examine this hypothesis, we
test the following model to see the impact of covenant violations on firms’ innovation
output:
∆Innovation Outputt,t+n = α3 + β5Violation + γ5′Control + γ6′DD + φj + ψt + θT + ε,
(13)
where ∆Innovation Outputt,t+n is the change in innovation output from quarter t
to quarter t + n. We measure Innovation Output either by the adjusted number of
patents applied in that quarter or the total number of citations for patents applied
in that quarter. We examine changes in output over three different horizons: four
quarters, eight quarters, and twelve quarters since it may take time for the effect of
lenders’ actions on R&D to turn up in the output. In addition to firm characteristics
used in previous regressions, we also control for firms’ beginning level of innovation
output in the regressions to avoid the mechanical relation between the beginning level
and subsequent change in the output. This model resembles Model (10), in which
we examine the change in innovation input after covenant violations. Our hypothesis
that lenders use control rights to improve firm’s R&D efficiency will be rejected if
covenant violations result in more decrease in the output relative to the decrease in
input.
Table 33 presents our estimation of Model (13). In Panel A we present the es-
timates in the entire sample. In Columns 1 to 3 (4 to 6) the dependent variable
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is change in the adjusted number of patents (citations). None of the models shows
a significant estimate in the coefficient of Violation. In Panel B we present the es-
timates of the same model in the discontinuity sample, where the absolute value of
relative default distance is less than 20% with respect to the three financial covenants.
Again we do not find any significant effect of covenant violations on the post-violation
change in innovation output.
Figure 10 and 11 plot the change in innovation output against distance to default
defined as the minimum relative distance to the three covenant thresholds. In contrast
to the change in R&D shown in Figure 9, there is no clear discontinuity in the change
in either the number of patent applications or citations just around the covenant
threshold. Also there is no significant shift in the change of innovation on the two
sides the cutoff other than a few outliers that are well below the threshold. The figures
and the regression results, combined with the previous results on the change in R&D,
suggests that when borrowers violate a loan covenant and the control rights pass to
the lenders, lenders use their enhanced bargaining power to extract a reduction in
firms’ R&D investment, but this is done without affecting their future innovation
output.
We perform several robustness tests on the insignificant effect of covenant vi-
olations on innovation output. Firstly, instead of measuring the total number of
citations, we use the average number of citations per patent as the outcome variable.
The sample size, however, is reduced substantially for this test because the number
is missing for firm-quarter observations with zero patent. Nevertheless, we find that
covenant violations are not associated with an decrease in the average number of cita-
tions per patent subsequently. Secondly, following Dass, Nanda, and Xiao (2014), we
drop the patent data between 2007 and 2010 from the regression sample to avoid the
results from being driven by the later observations which are subject to truncation
bias. Our findings are not changed after dropping those observations. These results
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are not reported for brevity and are available upon request.
The economics literature points to technological innovation as a primary source
for productivity gains and economic growth (Solow, 1957). These advances in tech-
nology and the knowledge base require sizable and ongoing investments in R&D, as is
underscored by models of endogenous growth (e.g., Romer 1990). Our results suggest
that bank financing can be a suitable source of financing even for innovative firms.
Even if the bank loans may not always directly finance R&D investment, but bank
financing may make funds available for R&D investment by financing other invest-
ments of the firm. Our results show that there is a cut in R&D investment following
covenant violations in line with the reduction in corporate investment documented
in the literature. But creditor intervention improves the efficiency of the firms’ R&D
investment and there is no decrease in innovation output after the covenant violations.
We note there is a concurrent working paper by Gu, Mao, and Tian (2014) that
explores a related question by studying the impact of covenant violations on the
innovation output of the firm. However, in contrast to our findings, their finding
is that firms’ innovation output decreases after covenant violations. They conclude
that banks help curtail excessive investments in innovative projects that are value-
destroying. R&D is one of the inputs to the innovation process that drives patenting
and we show that banks do in fact curtail excessive R&D. But we find that the
innovative output as measured by the patents and citations to patents doesn’t decrease
because banks curtail R&D when the innovative efficiency of the R&D investment is
lower. We would like to highlight that the debate is not between whether R&D or
patenting is a good measure of the innovative activity of the firm. Granted, R&D
information is missing for a significant fraction of the firms in the COMPUSTAT
data (partly due to firms not reporting the expense when it is insignificant). But
using patent measures of innovation doesn’t address this issue because the firms that
patent are mostly a subset of firms that report R&D expenses in COMPUSTAT. More
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importantly, conceptually, patenting is partly the output of innovation activities at
the firm and it doesn’t happen in vaccuum. A significant fraction of R&D expenditure
is the wages and salaries of scientists and engineers (see Hall and Lerner (2009)) and
hence R&D spending is a critical input to the innovation activities at the firm and
that may lead to patenting output at the firm. R&D is a firm policy that is the direct
observable action of creditor intervention. Patents on the other hand are an outcome
affected by many other factors. Its also not clear why there is an abrupt drop in the
patent output around covenant violations as one would expect that there would be a
lag after the covenant violations in the patents applied.
Apart from the aforementioned reasons, there are several methodological reasons
for the differences in findings between our paper and Gu, Mao, and Tian (2014). First,
their main empirical specification is propensity score matching (PSM) with the SEC
filing-based violation data provided by Nini et al. while we use the regression discon-
tinuity design (RDD) based on specific financial covenant thresholds from DealScan
and based on Chava and Roberts (2008). More importantly, in the one set of results
presented by Gu et al. (2014) where they apply RDD to the Dealscan-based covenant
data, they do not control for any observable firm characteristics in the discontinuity
sample. It is important to control for firm level characteristics, especially size of the
firm (that is highly correlated with the patenting) in order to reduce the omitted
variable bias. Finally, in all of their empirical tests, they control for the fixed effects
of 12 Fama-French industries and use the level of innovation output as the dependent
variable. This specification does not fully account for the heterogeneity across firms
that is invariant over time. In our specification we account for this effect by taking
the first difference of our dependent variables. An alternative way is to control for
firm fixed effects in the regression. In the unreported tests where we use the level of
R&D expenditure or innovation output as dependent variables with the inclusion of
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firm fixed effect, we find that R&D decreases after covenant violations but the num-
ber of patents (or citations) do not. This result holds using either DealScan-based
violations or SEC filing-based violations. The results are available upon request.
3.5 Conclusion
Corporate investment in R&D is an important ingredient of innovation and economic
growth. But R&D is a long-term investment with a uncertain payout and is mostly
intangible. In this paper, we shed light on whether banks, an important source
of debt capital for firms, are discerning with respect to the R&D projects of the
firm. Understanding the efficacy of bank financing of innovative firms is important:
Intellectual property (IP) and its creation contribute enormously to the value of many
public firms and the broader economy. Specifically, we investigate the consequences
of a loan covenant violation by the borrowing firm.
Violations of financial covenants in bank loans contracts lead to technical defaults
and a shift of control rights to the creditor and increase their bargaining power.
Lenders can then use the threat of accelerating the loan to extract concessions and/or
compel the borrowers to follow her preferred course of action. We contribute to the
literature on covenant violations by showing that an important corporate policy such
as R&D investment is also affected by the covenant violations.
Our results support the notion that banks, on the whole, appear to be discerning
in terms of the changes they require of the borrowing firms. There is a significant de-
crease in R&D following covenant violations, but the decline seems to be concentrated
in firms with a lower innovative efficiency. Consequently, while there is a significant
cut back in R&D expenses, it does not appear to come at the expense of innovative
output. Our results support the view that bank financing can be a viable source of
financing for R&D intensive firms.
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Table 25: Summary Statistics for Chapter 3
This panel presents summary statistics of the main variables used
in our analyses. We winsorize all the variables at the 1st and
99th percentiles. All the variables are defined in the Appendix.
N Mean Median Std. Dev.
Violation 28843 0.141 0.000 0.348
ROA 28843 0.031 0.032 0.040
Market-to-Book 28843 1.684 1.314 1.183
Ln(Assets) 28843 5.701 5.606 1.677
Net Worth 28843 519.741 126.379 1285.990
Tangible Net Worth 28637 509.667 125.527 1256.408
Current Ratio 28641 2.323 1.903 1.648
Ln(R&D) 28843 0.386 0.000 0.878
Ln(Patent) 28378 0.077 0.000 0.274
Ln(Citation) 28378 0.136 0.000 0.531
Innovative Efficiency (Patent) 4937 0.108 0.039 0.230
Innovative Efficiency (Citation) 4924 0.279 0.092 0.592
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Table 26: Change in R&D After Covenant Violations
In this table we examine whether lenders cut R&D after covenant violations. The sample consists
of firm-quarter observations of non-financial firms from the CRSP-Compustat merged database
that have effective covenants restricting the current ratio, net worth, or tangible net worth.
We present estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+n, the
log difference in the R&D expenditure between violation quarter and n quarters later. The
independent variable of interest is Violation, a binary variable that equal 1 if one of the three
financial covenants is binding. Firm characteristics including R&D/Assets, ROA, Market-to-Book,
Ln(Assets), and linear and squared default distance with respect to the three covenants are
included in the regressions. Calendar quarter dummies, fiscal quarter dummies and industry
dummies are also included. t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and calendar quarter
are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variable: ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+1 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+4 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+8
(1) (2) (3)
Violation -0.0113 -0.0158*** -0.0274**
(-1.55) (-2.65) (-2.53)
R&D/Assets -9.1813*** -3.3835*** -5.9850***
(-9.19) (-9.26) (-9.36)
ROA -0.7391*** 0.2347*** 0.4181***
(-5.88) (3.92) (3.16)
Market-to-Book 0.0342*** 0.0228*** 0.0330***
(8.18) (8.14) (6.48)
Ln(Assets) -0.0082 -0.0043*** -0.0132***
(-1.31) (-2.71) (-3.98)
Observations 28840 28380 27654
Adjusted R2 0.150 0.069 0.080
Industry Dummies X X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X X
Default Distance (1st & 2nd power) X X X
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Table 27: Change in R&D After Covenant Violations: Discontinuity Sample
In this table we examine whether lenders cut R&D after covenant violations. The sample consists
of firm-quarter observations of non-financial firms from the CRSP-Compustat merged database
that have effective covenants restricting the current ratio, net worth, or tangible net worth
and that the default distance with respect to these covenants is within a narrow bandwidth.
Specifically, in Panels A, B, and C the absolute value of the relative distance to the covenant
threshold is less than 50%, 20% , and 10%, respectively. We present estimates from regressions
where the dependent variable is ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+n, the log difference in the R&D expenditure
between violation quarter and n quarters later. The independent variables of interest is Violation,
which is a binary variable that equal 1 if one of the three financial covenants is binding. In
Columns 3 and 4 firm characteristics including R&D/Assets, ROA, Market-to-Book, Ln(Assets)
are included in the regressions. Calendar quarter dummies, fiscal quarter dummies and industry
dummies are also included. t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and calendar quarter
are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Dependent Variable: ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+4 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+8 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+4 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Bandwidth=50%
Violation -0.0201*** -0.0378*** -0.0121** -0.0209**
(-3.95) (-3.91) (-2.36) (-2.48)
Observations 17167 16826 14589 14286
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.015 0.073 0.094
Panel B: Bandwidth=20%
Violation -0.0127** -0.0345*** -0.0108* -0.0282***
(-2.01) (-3.04) (-1.68) (-3.06)
Observations 7486 7354 6401 6285
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.016 0.065 0.098
Panel C: Bandwidth=10%
Violation -0.0120 -0.0372** -0.0104 -0.0291**
(-1.46) (-2.56) (-1.15) (-2.53)
Observations 3612 3540 3093 3034
Adjusted R2 -0.003 0.025 0.062 0.123
Firm Controls X X
Industry Dummies X X X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X X X
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Table 28: Non-zero R&D Sample
This table replicates the baseline results in the subsample with non-zero R&D in the violation
quarter. Firm characteristics including R&D/Assets, ROA, Market-to-Book, Ln(Assets), and
linear and squared default distance with respect to the three covenants are included in the
regressions. In Panel B the absolute value of the relative distance to the covenant threshold
is less than 20%. Calendar quarter dummies, fiscal quarter dummies and industry dummies
are also included. t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and calendar quarter are
in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Subsample with Non-zero R&D





Adjusted R2 0.116 0.108
Firm Controls X X
Industry Dummies X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X
Default Distance (1st & 2nd power) X X
Panel B: Discontinuity Sample with Non-zero R&D





Adjusted R2 0.106 0.108
Firm Controls X X
Industry Dummies X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X
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Table 29: Covenant Violation Based on SEC Filings
This table replicates the main result using SEC filing-based covenant violation data pro-
vided by Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012). Firm characteristics including R&D/Assets, ROA,
Market-to-Book, Ln(Assets), Networth Ratio, and Current Ratio are included in the regres-
sions. Calendar quarter dummies, fiscal quarter dummies and industry dummies are also
included. t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and calendar quarter are in
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.












Networth Ratio 0.0262*** 0.0323***
(4.20) (2.88)
Current Ratio 0.0032*** 0.0036***
(5.28) (3.23)
Observations 143224 143222
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.092
Industry Dummies X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X
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Table 30: Anti-recharacterization Laws and Change in R&D After Covenant Violations
We present estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+n, the log
difference in the R&D expenditure between violation quarter and n quarters later. The independent
variable of interest is the interaction term between Violation and a binary variable that equal 1 after
the enactment of anti-recharacterization laws (AR) in the state the firm is located or incorporated.
In Panel A the sample consists of firm-quarter observations of non-financial firms from the CRSP-
Compustat merged database that have effective covenants restricting the current ratio, net worth,
or tangible net worth. Panel B presents the results for the discontinuity sample, where the absolute
value of the relative distance to the covenant threshold is less than 20%. Firm characteristics
including R&D/Assets, ROA, Market-to-Book, Ln(Assets) are included in the regressions. In Panel
A the linear and squared default distance with respect to the three covenants are included. Calendar
quarter dummies, fiscal quarter dummies, industry dummies, location state and incorporation state
dummies are also included. t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and calendar quarter
are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Entire Sample




Violation × Post AR 0.0215*** 0.0196
(2.67) (1.09)
Post AR 0.0022 0.0033
(0.38) (0.23)
Observations 27734 27038
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.085
Firm Controls X X
Industry Dummies X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X
Default Distance (1st & 2nd power) X X
Incorporation State Dummies X X
Headquarter State Dummies X X
Panel B: Discontinuity Sample




Violation × Post AR 0.0206* 0.0447**
(1.87) (2.45)
Post AR 0.0063 0.0101
(0.51) (0.42)
Observations 6358 6244
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.111
Firm Controls X X
Industry Dummies X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X
Incorporation State Dummies X X
Headquarter State Dummies X X
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Table 31: Operating Performance and Change in R&D After Covenant Violations
We present estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+n, the
log difference in the R&D expenditure between violation quarter and n quarters later. The
independent variables of interest are the interaction term between Violation and binary variables
indicating high/low ROA in the quarter prior to covenant violation. In Panel A the sample
consists of firm-quarter observations of non-financial firms from the CRSP-Compustat merged
database that have effective covenants restricting the current ratio, net worth, or tangible
net worth. Panel B presents the results for the discontinuity sample, where the absolute
value of the relative distance to the covenant threshold is less than 20%. Firm characteris-
tics including R&D/Assets, ROA, Market-to-Book, Ln(Assets) are included in the regressions.
In Panel A the linear and squared default distance with respect to the three covenants are
included. Calendar quarter dummies, fiscal quarter dummies and industry dummies are
also included. t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and calendar quarter are
in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Entire Sample
Dependent Variable: ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+4 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+8
(1) (2)
Violation × Low ROA -0.0240*** -0.0421***
(-3.65) (-3.37)
Violation × High ROA -0.0074 -0.0142
(-0.94) (-0.99)
High ROA -0.0013 -0.0039
(-0.37) (-0.53)
Observations 28185 27459
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.079
Firm Controls X X
Industry Dummies X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X
Default Distance (1st & 2nd power) X X
Panel B: Discontinuity Sample
Dependent Variable: ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+4 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+8
(1) (2)
Violation × Low ROA -0.0143* -0.0419***
(-1.84) (-3.57)
Violation × High ROA -0.0084 -0.0137
(-1.10) (-1.18)
High ROA 0.0049 -0.0102
(0.86) (-0.86)
Observations 6393 6277
Adjusted R2 0.064 0.100
Firm Controls X X
Industry Dummies X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X
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Table 32: Innovative Efficiency and Change in R&D After Covenant Violations
We present estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+n, the
log difference in the R&D expenditure between violation quarter and n quarters later. The
independent variables of interest are the interaction term between Violation and binary variables
indicating high/low Innovative Efficiency in the year prior to covenant violation. In Panel
A the sample consists of firm-quarter observations of non-financial firms from the CRSP-
Compustat merged database that have effective covenants restricting the current ratio, net
worth, or tangible net worth. Panel B presents the results for the discontinuity sample, where
the absolute value of the relative distance to the covenant threshold is less than 20%. Firm
characteristics including R&D/Assets, ROA, Market-to-Book, Ln(Assets) are included in the
regressions. In Panel A the linear and squared default distance with respect to the three covenants
are included. Calendar quarter dummies, fiscal quarter dummies and industry dummies are
also included. t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and calendar quarter are
in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Entire Sample
Innovative Efficiency based on: Patent Citation
Dependent Variable: ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+4 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+8 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+4 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) )
Violation × Low Efficiency -0.0748** -0.1412** -0.0561* -0.1218*
(-2.37) (-2.16) (-1.66) (-1.87)
Violation × High Efficiency -0.0516 -0.0937 -0.0714** -0.1238**
(-1.53) (-1.61) (-2.27) (-2.12)
High Efficiency -0.0032 0.0408 0.0300* 0.0436
(-0.20) (1.27) (1.93) (1.40)
Observations 4937 4928 4924 4917
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.106 0.128 0.106
Firm Controls X X X X
Industry Dummies X X X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X X X
Default Distance (1st & 2nd power) X X X X
Panel B: Discontinuity Sample
Innovative Efficiency based on: Patent Citation
Dependent Variable: ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+4 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+8 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+4 ∆Ln(R&D)t,t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Violation × Low Efficiency -0.0423 -0.1373** -0.0116 -0.0955
(-1.02) (-2.16) (-0.41) (-1.49)
Violation × High Efficiency -0.0166 -0.0699 -0.0495 -0.1235
(-0.44) (-0.94) (-1.28) (-1.61)
High Efficiency -0.0174 -0.0566 0.0246 -0.0137
(-0.39) (-0.66) (0.44) (-0.17)
Observations 937 937 933 933
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.113 0.152 0.110
Firm Controls X X X X
Industry Dummies X X X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X X X
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Table 33: Change in Innovation Output After Covenant Violations
In Columns 1 to 3 (4 to 6) the dependent variable is ∆Ln(Patent)t,t+n (∆Ln(Citation)t,t+n),
the log difference in the number of patents (citations per patent) between violation quarter and n
quarters later. The independent variables of interest is Violation. In Panel A the sample consists of
firm-quarter observations of non-financial firms from the CRSP-Compustat merged database that
have effective covenants restricting the current ratio, net worth, or tangible net worth. Panel B
presents the results for the discontinuity sample, where the absolute value of the relative distance
to the covenant threshold is less than 20%. Firm characteristics including ∆Ln(Patent)t (or
∆Ln(CitationsperPatent)t), R&D/Assets, ROA, Market-to-Book, and Ln(Assets) are included
in the regressions. In Panel A the linear and squared default distance with respect to the three
covenants are included. Calendar quarter dummies, fiscal quarter dummies and industry dummies
are also included. t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and calendar quarter are
in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Entire Sample
Dependent Variable: ∆Ln(Patent)t,t+n ∆Ln(Citation)t,t+n
n = 4 8 12 4 8 12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Violation -0.0060 -0.0051 -0.0019 -0.0030 -0.0019 -0.0039
(-1.46) (-1.06) (-0.32) (-0.41) (-0.23) (-0.38)
Ln(Patent)t -0.4076*** -0.4672*** -0.5306***
(-20.36) (-23.36) (-21.62)
Ln(Citation)t -0.4267*** -0.4967*** -0.5817***
(-24.89) (-26.97) (-24.66)
R&D/Assets 0.6573*** 0.7031*** 0.6669*** 1.3567*** 1.2430*** 0.9733**
(4.59) (4.02) (3.38) (4.89) (3.38) (2.27)
ROA 0.0587* 0.1020*** 0.1429*** 0.1315* 0.2335*** 0.2470***
(1.74) (2.75) (3.39) (1.86) (2.94) (2.82)
Market-to-Book 0.0038** 0.0058*** 0.0085*** 0.0077** 0.0108*** 0.0134***
(2.53) (2.76) (3.47) (2.51) (2.76) (3.16)
Ln(Assets) 0.0133*** 0.0120*** 0.0106*** 0.0220*** 0.0193*** 0.0171***
(8.32) (6.68) (5.24) (8.91) (6.27) (4.72)
Observations 27663 26852 25944 27663 26852 25944
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.451 0.513 0.348 0.426 0.519
Industry Dummies X X X X X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X X X X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X X X X X
Default Distance (1st & 2nd power) X X X X X X
Panel B: Discontinuity Sample
Dependent Variable: ∆Ln(Patent)t,t+n ∆Ln(Citation)t,t+n
n = 4 8 12 4 8 12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Violation -0.0027 -0.0032 0.0032 -0.0013 -0.0034 -0.0030
(-0.77) (-0.77) (0.56) (-0.20) (-0.45) (-0.32)
Observations 6289 6149 5994 6289 6149 5994
Adjusted R2 0.433 0.506 0.567 0.412 0.475 0.588
Firm Controls X X X X X X
Industry Dummies X X X X X X
Fiscal Quarter Dummies X X X X X X
Calendar Quarter Dummies X X X X X X
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Figure 9: Log change in R&D expenditure within 50% bandwidth of distance to default.
(a) One-quarter Change in Ln(R&D)
(b) Four-quarter Change in Ln(R&D)
(c) Eight-quarter Change in Ln(R&D)
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Figure 10: Log change in the adjusted number of patents within 50% bandwidth of distance to
default.
(a) Four-quarter Change in Ln(Patent)
(b) Eight-quarter Change in Ln(Patent)
(c) Twelve-quarter Change in Ln(Patent)
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Figure 11: Log change in the adjusted total number of citations within 50% bandwidth of distance
to default.
(a) Four-quarter Change in Ln(Citation)
(b) Eight-quarter Change in Ln(Citation)
(c) Twelve-quarter Change in Ln(Citation)
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DEFINITION FOR CHAPTER 1
• Patent is the number patent applications. To adjust for truncation bias, we back out the
truncated portion of patent applications based on the historical distribution using Equation
(1) for the number of applications from 2004 to 2007.
• Citation is the number citations on the applied patents. We use the adjustment factor pro-
vided by Hall et al. to adjust the number of citations for truncation bias.
• Pressure: For each firm-quarter, we calculate the net fund flow-driven trade as:
Σk(max(0,∆Holdingsi,k,t)|Flowk,t > 90thpctl.)− (max(0,−∆Holdingsi,k,t)|Flowk,t < 10thpctl.)
SharesOutstandingi,t−1
.
We assign a variable for each firm-quarter that equals to 1 if the net fund flow-driven trade
calculated above is positive, -1 if the net fund flow-driven trade is negative, and 0 otherwise.
Pressure for each fiscal year is measured as the absolute value of the average of this indicator
variable across the four quarters.
• Positive Pressure: For each firm-quarter, we assign a variable for each firm-quarter that
equals to 1 if the net fund flow-driven trade is positive, and 0 otherwise. Positive Pressure
for each fiscal year is measured as the average of this indicator variable of the four quarters.
• Negative Pressure: For each firm-quarter, we assign a variable for each firm-quarter that
equals to 1 if the net fund flow-driven trade is negative, and 0 otherwise. Negative Pressure
for each fiscal year is measured as the average of this indicator variable of the four quarters.
• Ln(R&D) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s R&D expenditure.
• Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets.
• Leverage is the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets.
• ROA is equal to earnings before extraordinary items divided by lagged asset .
• Q is the sum of total assets and the difference between market value and book value of total
common equity, divided by total assets.
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• SA Index is equal to −0.737 × Ln(Assets) + 0.043 × (Ln(Assets))2 − (0.040 ∗ Age) where
Assets is the total assets in billions of 2004 dollar and winsorized at $4.5 billion and Age is
winsorized at 37 years.
• CAPEX is the capital expenditure divided by lagged total assets.
• Ln(K/L) is the natural logarithm of total assets divided by number of employees.
• Tangibility is the net total value of property, plant and equipment, divided by total assets.
• Ln(Ret Volatility) is the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of daily stock returns in
the fiscal year.
• Herfindahl is the Herfindahl index of an industry defined by 4-digit SIC.
• Absolute Earnings Announcement CAR is the absolute value of average CAR from day -2 to
day 2 around earnings announcements.
• PIN is the probability of informed trading following Duarte and Young (2009).
• Absolute Stock Corr. with Peer Firms is the absolute value of correlation between the monthly
stock return of the firm with the average monthly stock return of peer firms over the fiscal
year.
• WW Index is equal to −0.091× CashFlowAssets − 0.062× I(CashDividendDummy > 0) + 0.021×
LongTermDebt
Assets −0.044×Ln(Assets)+0.102×3-digit SIC Industry Growth−0.035×(Sales Growth).
• Wealth-Performance Sensitivity is the scaled CEO wealth-performance sensitivity following
Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009).
• Blockholder Dummy is a binary variable that is equal to one if there is at least one blockholder
that has a minimum of 5% equity ownership in the firm, and zero otherwise.
• Shorter Investor Ownership is the number of shares held by transient investors (Bushee,
1998), divided the total number of the firm’s shares outstanding.
• Long Investor Ownership is the number of shares held by dedicated investors and quasi-
indexers (Bushee, 1998), divided the total number of the firm’s shares outstanding.
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APPENDIX B
VARIABLE DEFINITION FOR CHAPTER 2
• Treated : is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the firm has applied for patents in 1993 or
1994 and 0 otherwise.
• Ln(Amihud) is defined as ln(1 +AvgILLIQ× 109), where AvgILLIQ is an yearly average of







where Daysi,t is the number of valid observation days for stock i
in fiscal year t, and Ri,t,d and DolV oli,t,d are the return and dollar trading volume of stock i
on day d in the fiscal year t.







where Daysi,t is the number of observations for stock i in
fiscal year t, and Aski,t,d and Bidi,t,d are the closing ask and bid prices of the stock i on day
d of year t.





) where V oli,t,d and Shrouti,t,d
are the trading volume in shares and number of shares outstanding for firm i in day d of fiscal
year t. (We use “negative” turnover so that it measures illiquidity.)
• Ln(Analyst Dispersion) is defined as ln(1 + 100× SD(AnalystForecast)|MedianForecastedEarnings| ).
• Ln(Analyst Error) is defined as ln(1 + 100× |ActualEarnings−MedianForecastedEarnings||ActualEarnings| ).
• Ln(Patent Grants) is the logarithm of one plus the number of patent grants in the year.
• Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets.
• Leverage is the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets.
• Q is the sum of total assets and the difference between market value and book value of total
common equity, divided by total assets.
• Profitability is equal to EBITDA divided by total assets.
• Cash is the cash and equivalent divided by total assets.
• Tangibility is the net total value of property, plant and equipment, divided by total assets.
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• Ln(Age) is the natural logarithm of firm age in years.
• Return Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the fiscal year.
• Ln(Number of Analysts) is the natural logarithm of one plus maximum number of analysts
following the stock for the year. It is coded as 0 if there is not coverage from I/B/E/S.
• Market Share is the fraction of sales the firm accounted for in the corresponding 4-digit SIC
industry.
• Dividend Dummy is a binary variable that equals to 1 if firms pay dividend to common or
preferred stockholders and 0 otherwise.
• Public Debt Dummy is a binary variable that equals to 1 if firms have available S&P credit
rating and 0 otherwise.
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APPENDIX C
VARIABLE DEFINITION FOR CHAPTER 3
• Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets.
• ROA is equal to operating income divided by total assets.
• Market-to-Book : is the market value of equity plus total liability minus deferred taxes and
investment tax credit, divided by total assets.
• Net Worth Ratio: is the shareholders’ equity divided by total assets.
• Current Ratio: is total current assets divided by total assets.
• Ln(R&D) is the natural logarithm of R&D expenditure.
• Ln(Patent) is the natural logarithm of adjusted number of patent applications. The number
is adjusted by dividing the number of patents for each firm-year by the mean number of
patents of the same patent technology class and year.
• Ln(Citations per Patent) is the natural logarithm of adjusted number of citations per patent.
The number is adjusted by dividing the number of citations for each firm-year by the mean
number of citations of the same patent technology class and year.
• Innovative Efficiency (Patent) is the ratio of the number of patent applications of the year
divided by the depreciated R&D stock of the past five years.
• Innovative Efficiency (Citation) is the ratio of the number of citations for the patents applied
in the year divided by the depreciated R&D stock of the past five years.
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